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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
"Electricity reform is based on the premise that market mechanisms supply electricity much 
more efficiently than central planning can. But how will the poor, who have least purchasing 
power fare in a competitive market? Will those without access continue to be denied it as 
electricity supply changes from a public service to a profit-seeking business? And will the poor 
who have access suddenly find it una/fordable?" (Powel & Starks, 2000). 
1.1 RATIONALE 
The above quote summarises to a large degree the rationale of this study, that is, how will poor 
communities fare with restructured and often privatised electricity utilities. Will electricity 
services be extended to those who currently do not have a connection? And will they be able to 
afford the service? 
Since the early 1980's, a number of countries have been undertaking power sector reform. 
Very often the drivers for change included the need to reduce reliance on public finances and to 
obtain foreign capital, either to service loans, or for investing in new capacity. Latin American 
countries were the forerunners in this regard, with Chile amongst the first. The other main 
driver was to improve the financial and technical performance of the electricity industry. The 
rationale for this initiative could also be found in other factors, which are discussed as the 
countries are dealt with individually later in this document. One important aspect thereof is 
clearly the 'public benefit' implications of power sector reform, which are more pressing in 
developing countries. 
Until the 1980's, the electricity industry was viewed as a natural monopoly, and the concept of 
economies of scale reinforced this point of view. However, with dramatic technology 
improvements, it became possible to generate electricity competitively in smaller power plants, 
and thus alternatives to monopolistic industries were increasingly feasible. Competition is now 
possible in generation and supply. Developers other than the state can participate in the 
industry either as Independent Power Producers (IPPs) or as distributors and suppliers of 
electricity. According to the principle of competition, the introduction of new players into the 
market should lower electricity prices. This study investigates if this holds true in developing 












Power sector reform generally involves a number of discrete steps. If incumbent, state-owned 
enterprises are performing badly - then initial steps might involve commercialisation and 
corporatisation: i.e. greater emphasis is placed on financial viability (prices and income 
covering costs). The utility may also be placed within a corporate governance framework, at 
arms length to government, with professional management and a clear shareholder performance 
agreement. 
The next step in refonn often involves vertical unbundling of the competitive elements of the 
industry from non-competitive elements: i.e. generation and supply, which are potentially 
competitive, are separated from transmission and distribution wires businesses - which tend to 
remain natural monopolies. The generation business might also be horizontally unbundled into 
a number of competing companies. Competition can then be encouraged through the 
development of a power exchange or a market for bilateral contracts. Competition might also 
be encouraged through private investors bidding for Independent Power Producer contracts or 
for private concessions. 
Power sector reform might also involve privatisation - where state-owned assets are divested. 
Power sector reform invariably also involves the establishment of independent regulators who 
are responsible for setting electricity tariffs in those sector of the industry where competition is 
still absent or, with competition authorities, they might also be responsible for monitoring and 
safe-guarding against market power and abuse. 
Whether the structure is a monopoly and vertically-integrated, or unbundled, competitive and 
privatised, all power sectors have to strive towards higher efficiency and improved 
performance, whether the agenda is financial sustain ability or public-benefit oriented. In a time 
when power sector reform is sweeping many parts of the world, it is important to review 
experience to date with respect to the impact on the welfare of the poor. This is the rationale 
for this study. It is important to learn about past efforts and mistakes, and to identify areas of 
improvement for power sector reform initiatives. 
1.2 OBJECTIVES 
In essence, this study seeks to identify the impacts of power sector reform on access to 
electricity by poor communities. Access is defined in terms of physical electrification and also 











In the first instance, this study investigates the nature of power sector reform in different 
developing countries in terms of moving from monopolies to competition and steps such as 
corporatisation, unbundling and privatisation. Secondly, the study looks at progress in 
electrification and impacts on prices. Thirdly, the study identifies relevant energy policies 
regulatory instruments, financial mechanisms and implementing agencies that are conducive for 
promoting access to electricity as power sectors are reformed. 
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 
The above questions have been investigated in the context of a number of country case studies. 
The study does not pretend to be comprehensive or representative. Rather, a number of 
countries in Latin America, Africa and South East Asia have been chosen that cover a range of 
reform situations that are sufficiently interesting and different - and where some data is 
available. The intention is to give a broad overview of some international trends - rather than a 
definitive global answer to the research questions identified above. 
The methodology followed in this study relied primarily on information gathering from the 
internet, as most of the documents used, with particular reference to regions such as South East 
Asia and Latin America, are very difficult to get hold of in hard copy format. One of the 
benefits of internet-based research is that documentation is often posted on the internet soon 
after publication or conferences held. The documentation was generally downloaded in either 
HTML-format, or PDF format, and saved on hard-drive to work on as the need arose. 
There are many limitations of internet-based research for a study of this kind. Often abstracts 
were given in English regarding a certain topic, but the document itself was in a foreign 
language. Data is not necessarily up-to-date and often it was simply impossible to obtain 
sufficient time-series data to assess real impacts on electrification rates and on electricity prices. 
Some electrification data, particularly in South East Asia, refers mainly to villages, rather than 
households. 
The ideal would have been to collect primary data personally and to have visited all the case 
study countries. In the absence of sufficient sources, this was impossible. Nevertheless, this 
internet-based project has created a useful opportunity to provide a new overview of 











intimidating task of sifting through masses of information has provided a tough test of the 
author/student's ability to locate, collate and analyse relevant information and present it in a 
form that provides a coherent picture of international trends and useful lessons for future best 
practice. 
Power sector reform is an ongoing process. At some point, the study had to define a cut-off 
date around data collection. This was March 2003 - and hence the analysis does not 
necessarily include latest developments. 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
Each chapter deals with a particular geographical region, with three different countries covered 
in each region. Each individual country approaches power sector reform in its own particular 
way, although there are certain general trends noticeable. Each country section attempts to 
describe the pre-reform situation and drivers for change, the changes themselves, the 
introduction of laws and bills to accommodate such changes, and impacts on electrification and 
the affordability of electricity, 
Chapter two provides an overview of the Latin American experience with regard to power 
sector reform, and deals with Brazil, Chile and Argentina. This region was chosen as the first 
chapter as Chile and Argentina were some of the first countries to embark on power sector 
reform. 
Chapter three provides an overview regarding the status of power sector reform in Africa, and 
deals with Uganda, Namibia and South Africa. This chapter seeks to showcase a variety of 
conditions and possible futures of power sectors, and their approaches to widened access to 
electricity. 
Chapter four deals with South East Asian counties - Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. They 
are generally more developed, but still have communities with poor access to electricity and 
other energy services, 
Chapter five is the conclusion to this study and attempts to consolidate the information obtained 
about the three regions, and to draw some conclusions from their experiences that can be 











CHAPTER TWO - LATIN AMERICA 
2.1 BRAZIL 
2.1.1 OVERVIEW 
Brazil is the largest country in South America, with a population of approximately 176 million 
people. Approximately 78% of the population is urbanised, or peri-urbanised. In 2000, the per 
capita GDP was US$ 3,524, and between 1970 and 2000, and average annual population 
gro\\'ih rate was 2%, the economic growth rate approximately 4,3%, and total energy 
consumption grew by 5,4% per annum during this period. The electricity market has 
approximately 45 million customers, consuming an average of about 300 GWh per annum. 
Currently Brazil has a power generating capacity of 74GW, of which 95% is hydro-generated. 
There are three main areas in which the electricity system is operating: 
• South/South-Central; 
• Northeast; and 
• some isolated systems 
The heaviest load is carried by the South-Central region; hydro facilities are located on only a 
few rivers. Brazil has some large river systems, which are utilised not only for electricity 
generation, but also irrigation and navigation. As droughts were experienced during some 
seasons, it is recognised that there is a need for some thermal generation. Droughts can wreak 
havoc with the ability to supply sufficient electricity according to demand (Brown A, 2002). 
Brazil had until recently five state-level vertically-integrated utilities (CEMIG, COPEL, CEEE, 
CESP AND CELG) but some are in a process of unbundling. ELETROBRAS is currently 
acting as a holding company and sector-financing agent, as well as being responsible for many 
of the integrative functions of the sector, such as the CEPEL R&D Facility. There are four 
regional generation/transmission subsidiaries ofELETROBRAS: 
• FURNAS - operating in the South-Central area, and is also responsible for the Angra 
power station 
• ELETROSUL - owning hydro and thermal plants in the South; 
• CHESF - owning the hydro plants on the San Francisco River in the Northeast; and 
• ELETRONORTE which IS responsible for some of the integrated 
generation/transmission systems in the North, and the Centre-West, as well as many of 











Together, the above-mentioned companies represent some 38% of available electricity capacity. 
In addition, there is also ITAIPU - the Brazil-Paraguay bi-national company, which accounts 
for 24% of available electricity. (Brazil is entitled to 50% of consumption, but it actually 
purchases some additional electricity). There are other entities, consisting of 24 more public, 
private and municipal distribution and retail concessionaires, small rural electricity co-
operatives and auto-generators. The distribution utilities - some 31 companies, are primarily 
responsible for distribution and retail under public service concessions, which cover all, or a 
substantial part of the 26 states and federal districts. At least three of these have been privatised 
and preparations are in progress in several states to undergo the same process (no author -
www.mnr.gov.br.energia-i.htm). 
Currently, the structural players in the market are: 
• ANEEL, which is semi-independent, regulating and controlling activities 111 the 
electricity sector; 
• The National Electricity System Operator (ONS), created in 1988, to coordinate and 
oversee the optimisation of the generation and transmission activities among the 
interconnected systems; 
• The Wholesale Electricity Market (MAE), which started operating in 2000, and is the 
official registry for long-term power contracts and the official market-place for short-
term market deals. It oversees consumption and monitors prices, centralising and 
allocating electricity flows and generation schedules to minimise operating risks. MAE 
membership consists of generators, IPP's concessionaire utilities with more than 50MW 
capacity, and sellers handling more than 50MW; 
• The Coordinating Committee for Planning and Expansion of the Electricity Systems 
(CCPE) which started operating in 2000 
(no author - WV>lW .infrastructure brazil. gov. brl englishlperfisl ene 1 . asp ). 
2.1.2 INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND FRAMEWORK 
The electricity industry in Brazil originated in the 1890s. In 1934, it was determined that the 
federal government would be allowed to grant developmental rights in the electricity sector to 
private initiatives. Later the federal government decided that multilateral banks could only 
provide financing for state owned electricity generating projects. With this decision, was born 
the first state-owned electricity companies that were responsible for supplying Brazil's 











Administration of President Kubitschek, the Targets Plan was launched which called for 
intensive state-involvement in the energy sector. The process of state-involvement peaked in 
1963, with the founding of ELETROBRAS. The state utility grew in the 1970's with the aid of 
international finance backed by state guarantees. This situation led to surplus installed capacity 
(no author - www.mrc.gov.br.boletim/energia-i.htm & Costa, 2001). 
Between 1950 and 1990, successive governments invested heavily in hydroelectric plants. The 
systems permitted energy to be stored in huge water reservoirs and different rainfall cycles 
could be counterbalanced through a federal transmission system that linked the different river 
basins. The unfavourable economic situation of the 1980's did not directly affect the electricity 
sector, which was able to meet demand even though investment in the energy sector had dried 
up. However, the industry became progressively more indebted and for long periods tariffs 
were below actual costs. (no author - www.mrc.gov.br.boletim/energia-i.htm & Costa, 2001) 
Currently, Brazil is experiencing slower than expected economic growth, and is grappling with 
electricity shortages. The hydro-dependent electricity sector is strained beyond capacity after 
several years of below-average rainfall. During May 2001, government announced that both 
industrial and residential consumers had to reduce consumption by 20% for pre-determined 
times, or face fines. Residential customers were required to cut consumption to 80% of their 
average use for the months of May to July 2001. The rationing ended on 28 February 2002. 
Under-investment in the sector was viewed as the primary cause for shortages, as demand grew 
rapidly in the 1990' s with 1999-consumption being approximately 55% higher than in 1990. 
Installed capacity grew by some 25% during the same period, but over the past twenty years, 
consumption has risen at rates that outstripped the growth in GDP. For the most part, this has 
been the result of urban population growth, government's efforts to make electricity more 
affordable, and the modernisation of the economy. During this period, the increase in 
residential, commercial and rural consumption is noteworthy, but the industrial sector did not 
show such intense growth. 
(No author-
www.iie.org/programs/energy/down10adss/Proceedings/EnergySectorProfiles/Brazil.doc) 
Some of the drivers for the restructuring process can be described as the following: 
• In an attempt to reduce government debt, power sector reform has taken place in parallel 
to fundamental changes in economic policy, which have been designed to stabilise the 











• To address social needs, especially socio-economic needs and low electrification rates; 
• Improving the performance of the distribution sector; 
• Ensuring reliable electricity supply and enhance access to electricity for those 
communities not connected to electricity; 
• Establishing conditions that encourage economic efficiency In all segments of the 
sector; 
• Supporting the further development of economical hydro-electrical plants as the largest 
source of indigenous energy; 
• Creating conditions that will support the continuation and sustainability of the 
privatisation programme (no author - www.mre.gov.brlenergia-i.htm; and no author 
www.eletrobrasgov.br/downloads/ /planejamento/relatorio _ eng/Stage%20IV IDraft%20R 
eport%20IV -lISummary%20 l.pdf). 
2.1.3 REGULATORY REFORM 
The Brazilian power sector reform commenced during 1993, with the implementation of 
important regulatory legislation, based on the 1988 constitution. The following were the legal 
landmarks paving the way for the reform process: 
• The 1995 Concession Laws (Laws No 8987 and 9074); 
• The approval of the National Privatisation Program (PND); 
• The extension of privatisation to the State Privatisation Program (PED); 
• The Federal Law 9427 of December 1996, which created the Electricity Regulatory 
Agency (ANEEL) 
• The creation of two officially recognized private bodies, the Wholesale Energy Market 
(MAE), and the National Electricity System Operator (ONS). (No author -
www.infrastructurebrazil.gov.br/englishlperfis/enel.asp). 
ANEEL is a semi-governmental organisation, established with a public, legal personality and 
assets, with administrative and financial autonomy. The mission of ANEEL is to promote the 
development of electricity markets in a regulated and balanced manner. Activities started in 
December 1997. The structure of ANEEL is two-tiered, with a Board of Directors (consisting 
of a Director-General and four Directors) and twenty superintendents. ANEEL' S main 
functions are: 
• The regulation of generation, transmission, distribution and trade of electricity; 











• To authorise new electricity installations and services; 
• Ensure fair competition in the industry, as well as open access to electrical systems; 
• Ensuring fair consumer rates and the provision of quality services to create conditions 
encouraging continued investment; 
• Ensuring electricity supply to customers of all levels of income - rural and urban - as 
well as those living in areas with low demographic or economic density; 
• To educate and inform industry players and society about energy policies; 
• Decentralising ANEEL's activities to state-wide regulatory agencies by means of 
agreements; 
• Ensuring transparency and effectiveness in its relations with society 
(No author - www.aneel.br.org). 
Brazil had no history of independent regulation, and the formation of the regulatory agency was 
preceded by privatisation and concessions. There remain critical issues within ANEEL, such as 
the ability to attract and retain well-trained staff, and a lack of professional diversity. In 
addition, the agency is plagued by budgetary uncertainty. The Performance Contract with the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy and the relationships with other government agencies remain 
problematic. Challenges revolve around the boundaries of policy and regulation, and the 
centralisation or decentralisation of regulation. The judiciary is inexperienced in regulatory 
matters, with a lack of defined criteria for judicial review and remedies. Brown (2003) also 
notes a lack of resources for consumer advocacy, as well as a lack of coordination with other 
network regulators (Brown 2003). 
2.1.4 PRIVATISATION DRIVE 
Subsequently, the State has decided to focus its role on policy-making and regulation, rather 
than as the owner of electricity assets and has embarked on the National Privatisation 
Programme (PND). The 1995 passing of the Ordinary Act ~4ct 9,074), gave legal sanction to 
the constitutional principle that the State is allowed to transfer the operations of public utilities 
to private investors. ESCELSA, which was a concessionaire of ELETROBRAS, was the first 
electricity distributor to be privatised, followed by LIGHT during June 1996. Other companies 
that were also privati sed between 1995 and 1996 were COELBA (Bahia), CEMIG (Minas 
Gerais) and CFPL (the 2nd largest distribution company in Sao Paolo). The number of 
invitations to tender for the privatisation of more distributors and new hydroelectric plants 











National Operator of the Electricity Grid (ONS), and the Wholesale Electricity Market (MAE) 
(no author - www.mre.gov.br.boletim/energia-i.htmandLewiset.al. 1999). 
Brazil initially chose to limit the scope of the electricity market in varIOUS ways. When 
privatisation commenced, all available generation capacity was allocated among distributors, 
giving each player a mixture of contracts from older and newer hydro stations. It enabled a 
mixture of cheaper and more expensive power assets. From 2003 to 2006, these original energy 
contracts were to be renewed one year at a time, dropping the volume each year by 25% of the 
original amount to reach zero in 2006. The so-called "original energy" that becomes available 
(25% per annum) can be negotiated freely, but never for periods of less than a year. The spot 
market is limited to a maximum of 15% of the total market. The MAE and NOS have 
established procedures in order to distribute this 15% load between generation companies, 
using criteria including marginal operating cost and optimisation of reservoir capacity in each 
hydro basin within the regional sub-markets; 
a) MAE set up a phase-in for spot prices, namely: 
• 1 September 2000 monthly 
• 1 July 2001 - weekly 
• 1 January 2002 - hourly 
b) Spot market sales are conducted in four regional sub-markets, North, Northeast, South 
and Southeast and Midwest, and are not allowed to be conducted across regional 
boundaries. Only long-term contracts of more than one year can cross the regional 
boundaries; 
c) The spot market acts as a commodity market for energy that is not tied to bi-Iateral 
contracts, and whose price is determined by prevailing conditions of supply and demand 
(No author- www.infrastructurebrazil.gov.brlenglishiperfis/eneI.asp). 
Critics of the privatisation of the power sector argue that ELETROBRAS' s competent planning 
staff were disbanded and nothing similar was created in its place. Privatisation also brought 
tariff increases, which were not popular among consumers. As an example, LIGHT, (Rio de 
Janeiro), was auctioned in May 1996 to the French EDF, American AES and Brazilian CSN. 
Under the contract LIGHT would receive energy from the State generating company Furnas at 
$23 per MWh, and would sell it to consumers for $I20/MWh. According to a survey carried 
out by the Consumer Defence Institute (IDEC), since 1995, electricity tariffs have risen 108% 











The following table summarises privatisation transactions in Brazil since 1995: 








ELETROB-RA~S~---+-B~anks and pension funds 
LIGHT ·-1ELETROBRAS 
I---E=R-=J~--~-- fio de Janeiro State 







EMIG (33% steak) Minas Gerais State ES, Southern Electric, local 
OELBA Bahia State 
PFL Sao Paulo State 
RGE (CEEE) Rio Grande do Sui State 
AES-Sul (CEEE) Rio Grande do Sui State 
CEMAT ELETROBRAS, Mato 
Grosso State 
I r-. __ . 
ENERSUL lMato Grosso do Sui State 
ENERGIPE FLETROBRAS, Sergipe 
State 
COS ERN ELETROBRAS, Rio 
Grande do Norte State 
K=OELCE ;Ceara State 






Iberdrola, Previ, BB 
Investimentos 
BC (Votorantim + 
Bradesco + Camargo Correa), 
institutional investors 










k:ELPA ;Grupo Rede 
iELEKTRO (CESP) [Sao Paulo State IEnron 
rn. -
f--_. ___ f--an_d_e_lr_a_n_te_(_E_le_t_ro_p_a_u_lo_) -l-S_a_o_P_a_u~l.o __ S_t_at_e ____ -I-.IE_D_P_, ~CPFL ~ 
1999 lParanapanema (CESP) Sao Paulo State Duke Energy 
-.--.~-----j 
IETE (CESP) Sao Paulo State ES 
ELB ampina Grande fataguazes-Leopoldina I 












2.1.5 ELECTRIFICATION INITIATIVES 
The State and Municipal Electric Power Development Program (PRODEEM), which was 
created by the Ministry of Mines and Energy, is intended to foster integrated development, 
while acting as a catalyst for new decentralised power generation projects fuelled by locally 
available sources. PRODEEM finances the installation of community-oriented projects such as 
electrification 
(No author-
\Vww.worldenergy .org/wec-geis/publications/reportsl rural/case _ studies/annII_ brazil. asp ). 
It is estimated that about 12% of the country's popUlation remains without electricity. In the 
three states of Bahia, Ceara and Minas Gerais alone, more than a million households are 
expected to remain une1ectrified in 2005. In the past, special programs were run, subsidised by 
the federal and state governments as well as bilateral donors, which attempted to provide 
electricity to dispersed popUlations through the use of decentralised systems, many of them 
utilising renewable energy. These efforts were severely limited by lack of resources and the 
failure to design cost-recovery systems in the projects. (No author-\v\Vw.worldenergy.orglwec-
geis/publications/reportsl rural/case _ studies/annII _ brazil. asp ). 
Much remains to be done in the rural parts of the country where only 63% of households have 
electric power. In the poorer areas, the problem of supplying rural communities is particularly 
acute, for instance in the Northeast less than half of rural households have access to electricity. 
In 1983, an agreement was signed by two utilities, COPEL and CEMIG, with the World Bank, 
covering financing for electrification in two states. As a result 123 000 properties in Parana and 
95 000 in Minas Gerais were electrified. 
Rural co-operates play an important part in the role of rural electrification, particularly through 
the first and second national rural electrification programs (I PNER and II PNER) which 
allocated funding from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Federal 
Government to finance rural electrification. Some 115 000 rural properties were covered by 
these programs, although the regional distribution of these communities were uneven. The 
Southern region absorbed 56% of these funds, the Northeast 25%, with only 10% for the 
Southeast and 7% for the Centre-West. From the late 1980s rural electrification slowed down 











In 1994 ELETROBRAS set up the Rural Electrification Priorities Committee to allocate 
funding from the Global Reversion Fund for rural electrification. The Smallholder Support 
Program is another important source of investment as it offers a line of credit from the World 
Bank. In addition to federal funds, rural electrification is also backed up by allocations in state 
budgets. Based on a pilot project underway in Rio Grande do Sulk, BNDES opened a line of 
credit to finance electrification for farmers. For communities which are remote and dispersed, 
it would not be viable to connect to either of the main networks, and decentralised systems offer 
advantages over more traditional solutions (No author - www.worldenergy.org/wec-
geis/publicationslreportsl rural/case _ studies/annIl_ brazil.asp). 
The National Programme of Rural Electrification, managed by ELECTRO BRAS, was started in 
2000 and was due for completion by the end of 2003. The project aimed at bringing electricity 
to one million rural households and properties, benefiting about five million people. It is 
however not clear exactly how many households were actually supplied with electricity during 
this period. (No author - web page - www.br.undp.org/propoorBRA00015A.htm). 
2.1.5 CONCLUSION 
Brazil's reform of its power sector has stopped short of a fully competitive and private 
electricity market. A hybrid system has emerged with the state continuing to own generation, 
transmission and distribution companies. However, sections of the industry have been 
privatised and the private sector has also been invited to build new power plant. The electricity 
market is determined less by price bids and offers than by engineering algorithms that seek to 
optimise the operation of the country's hydro basins. It has been a difficult environment for new 
investments in thermal generating plant. The new government in Brazil has given a stronger 
role to the state in planning and controlling the power sector. 
What has been the impact on access to electricity by poor people? Power sector reform had to 
deal with the problem of financial solvency of utilities as well as the need for new investment. 
It was inevitable that prices had to rise. In this respect, the impact of reform was negative for 
electricity customers, in the short term, although an absence of reforms could have threatened 
the viability of the industry and its capacity to continue providing reliable services. 
Brazil is in the fortunate situation of having the majority of its populace in and around large 











developing countries with dispersed rural populations. Nevertheless, Brazil still faces 
considerable challenges in serving remote communities. 
The Brazilian government stated explicitly that the restructuring programme will attempt to 
ensure a reliable electricity supply, and continue to electrify those without electricity.. Special 
programs attempted to provide electricity to dispersed populations. When all the efforts to 
enhance access to electricity are reviewed, it is clear that there was always the political will to 
broaden electricity supply. A case in point is the Federal Program for Energy Development of 
States and Municipalities launched by the Ministry of Mines and Energy, as well as the 
National Programme of Rural Electrification. 
While certain distributors were privatised, these are subject to regulation by ANEEL whose 
mandate includes looking after the interests of poor consumers. There is little statistical data 
available on connection rates, thus making it difficult to translate the efforts made into concrete 
evidence. However, indicators are that the despite flaws in the system as mentioned, there has 
been greater access to electricity by communities. As in many other sectors, however, the key 
to success lies in successful private/public partnerships and cohesive concessionaire systems in 













The electricity sector in Chile is divided into two sectors. Firstly, the generation-transmission 
sector consists of companies which generate electricity from thermal and hydroelectric sources. 
This sector transmits electricity at high voltage for sale to distribution companies and selected 
large customers. Secondly, the distribution sector which consists of distribution companies that 
purchase electricity from generation companies for distribution at lower voltages for sale to 
customers (Bernstein, 1991) 
Currently, the installed capacity is approximately 10,370 MW. Demand is growing at 6% per 
annum, and it is estimated that an extra 480MW is needed each year to avoid power shortages. 
A new 570MW plant in being constructed on the Bio-Bio, Chile's largest dam. In April 2003, a 
10-year plan outlined the types of investment that government will promote. Government will 
support the construction of 10 combined-cycle plants until 2012, and one hydroelectric plant. 
(N 0 author-www.platts.com. features/LatinAmeri can/Chile.shtml). 
2.2.2 INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND FRAMEWORK 
As in many other countries, the private sector took the early lead in the development of the 
power sector in Chile. However, in 1931, Government announced an amendment to the 
General Law on Electrical Services. This, combined with the economic crisis of the 1930's, 
saw many private companies abandoning their participation in the industry. This situation led 
to the state taking charge of the generation and transmission of electricity, and the private sector 
limited its participation to distribution and maintenance of power stations. ENDESA became 
the dominant state-owned utility. Finally, CHILECTRA was nationalised in 1970, and during 
1971 prices were frozen. Multilateral banks discontinued loans to the power sector, which led 
to the stagnation of the industry. After 1974, there was a move towards cost-recovery. Private 
firms could now manage state-owned enterprises, but unfortunately, the commercialisation 
failed to address the roots of the structural problems of the sector. No real progress was made 
in terms of efficiency of the overall sector. State-domination of the sector remained, with 
government owning 90% of the generation sector, 100% of the transmission network and 80% 
of distribution. In addition, there was also political interference regarding the appointment of 
excess personnel, as well as the development of projects that were not suited to their needs at 











The State had the obligation to ensure an efficient industry, and had to provide sufficient 
mechanisms to ensure the meeting of basic needs. A crucial intervention was the clear 
separation of the regulatory and business-related sections of the industry. The National Energy 
Commission (NEC) was created during the late 1970's, as well as the National Energy 
Commission and Planning Office (ODEPLAN). These institutions played a crucial role in the 
transformation of the power sector. The Corporation for Fostering Development (CORFO) was 
given responsibility for the management of energy-producing, state-owned companies, serving 
as a government-controlled holding company. CORFO was central in the re-organisation of the 
companies, controlling their management, unbundling and privatisation (Bernstein, 1991). 
The 1982 Electricity Law created the foundation for electricity sector reform. Market 
conditions were created where electricity generators could compete to provide electricity to 
large consumers, whilst sharing the transmission network. Policies were formulated by the 
NEC, which also acted as the basic regulatory institution. Rudnick (1994, p.2) states that: "The 
overall energy policy aimed at maximising the welfare of the community by establishing 
conditions of efficiency in the development and operation of the national energy system, and 
assigning the state a subsidiary role. The necessity of de-concentrating decentralising and 
privatisation of the activities and properties of the energy sector companies was recognised as 
desirable for the stability of the system". 
Large state companies were unbundled, and explicit separation took place between generation, 
transmission and distribution activities. In addition, the Economic Load Dispatch Centre was 
implemented. This centre co-ordinates the operation of the generation companies in order to 
obtain the minimum overall operation cost of the system. Open access to the transmission 
system was ensured as well. On of the most crucial instruments was the full privatisation of 
state-owned electricity distribution companies, as well as the sale of majority state equity shares 
in state-owned generation companies (Rudnick, 1994). 
2.2.3.1 REGULATION 
State-involvement in electricity regulation began as early as 1925, with the introduction of the 
General Law on Electrical Services. This Law was intended to regulate the use of water for 
electricity generation purposes, as well as the use of private property and compensation to 
private parties for the installation of transmission lines. There was some degree of uncertainty 











utilities fulfilled both these roles, which created a conflict of interest between the business and 
social objectives. The States' regulatory function was handed over to the NEC and ODEPLAN 
in 1978. The NEC acts as a decentralised advisory body, which reports directly to the 
President. It consists of a 7-member council, and is presided over by an Executive Secretary. 
The Secretariat is responsible for the commission's technical activities, as well as its 
administration. ODEPLAN prepared annual 'Ministerial Programs' with specific goals and 
defined rules for state-owned firms in particular. The NEC was made responsible for 
coordinating large-scale investment decisions made by state-owned utilities. Once a significant 
part of the sector had been privati sed, the central planning was replaced by individual efforts 
undertaken by private companies. Therefore, some institutional and legal adjustments had to be 
made in order to achieve efficient management within state-o\Nned companies, and to level the 
regulatory playing field for state-owned and private firms (Bernstein, 1991). 
During May 2002, the NEC submitted the new electricity bill to congress. The bill, known as 
the "Ley Carta" was designed to rectify the most pressing distortions in the regulatory system 
in order to maintain levels of supply and investment in the industry. It is the first part of a 
three-stage legislation process, which will be followed by a modification of government 
electricity nornlS. The submission of a further bill, titled "Ley II" is meant to remove all 
remaining distortions in the regulatory system. Currently, the wholesale prices are regulated 
and set every six months, and are based on the utilities' marginal cost for the next 48 months. 
This price makes up approximately 40%-50% of the retail customers' final bilL The other part 
of the bill is made up of a distribution price, set every four years, which relates to the 
distributor's costs. Customers with more that 2MW consumption are not subjected to regulated 
rates and are eligible to freely negotiate power purchase agreements 
(No author-www.platts.com/features/LatinAmericanPower/Chile.shtml) 
2.2.4 UNBUNDLING AND PRIV ATISATION 
Large, vertically integrated, state-owned electricity companies were separated into generation 
and distribution firms and were also sub-divided into regional companies. Subsidiaries of 
ENDESA and CHILECTRA were formed, as well as new companies dependent on CORFO. 
CHILECTRA was divided into three sub-divisions. CHILGENER was charged with generating 
and transmitting energy in the Santiago-Valparaiso area, CHILECTRA METROPOLIT ANA 
would distribute electricity in Santiago, and CHILECTRA V -Region took charge of distributing 











company dedicated exelusively to the generation of electricity. ENDESA created two 
generating subsidiaries. Some affiliates broke away to form independent companies. 
Essentially, two possible paths of privatisation were identified: 
1) The sale of entire companies to individual investors and providing 'share packages' to 
institutional investors; and 
2) The widespread sale of smaller packets to individuals through so-called popular 
capitalism 
During the early part of the sales, criticism emerged from various quarters regarding the 
price of shares, and arguments were heard that the State was selling property at prices below 
their book value. In addition, the argument was heard that private investors should make 
investments with the same low rate of return as the State. The first privatisation phase 
consisted of the public sale of two ENDESA subsidiaries in the late 1980's. Opposition 
from CORFO regarding the privatisation of the largest subsidiaries - ENDESA and 
CHILECTRA led to a situation, where from 1980 to 1983, almost no progress was made. 
However, progress was made in the formation of regional distribution companies, and the 
break-up of CHILECTRA into local subsidiary companies. Between 1983 and 1987, three 
small-scale hydroelectric plants belonging to CHILECTRA were sold through public bids, as 
well as the sale of two ENDESA-owned stations, transforming them into subsidiary 
companies. Following these sales, the process picked up speed with the full-scale sale of the 
CHILECTRA-Generating, Metropolitana and V -Regions. ENDESA was experiencing 
considerable financial difficulty due to its huge debt, and during 1985, the government 
reduced some of the firm's capital holdings to absorb debt. ENDESA'S status improved, 
which aided the process of attracting private investors. (Bernstein 1991). 
2.2.5 ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY AND ELECTRIFICATION 
The results of the electricity reform in Chile were wide-ranging. There is a measured 
improvement in efficiency, with lower electricity tariffs compared to nations where the industry 
operates without reform. It is important to note that Chile seemingly succeeded in maintaining 
electrification efforts throughout the power sector reform process. In 1987, 91% of urban 
households had access to electricity. It would appear that electrification efforts in the greater 
Santiago area were largely successful. Firms such as CHILECTRA METROPOLIT ANA have 
completely revamped their customer service and billing systems, and implemented policies 











In rural areas, however, connection and operational costs increase as populations become more 
geographically dispersed. According to ladresic (2000), by the early 1990's, a million people, 
(almost half of the rural population) still had no access to electricity. The most severe lack of 
access is concentrated in a few regions where the majority of the rural population lives. Lower-
income families are affected the most, as wealthier communities can afford to install generators, 
or pay for extension to the grid. 
The New Rural Electrification Programme (REP) was initiated at the end of 1994 by the NEe. 
Each of the 12 regions administers and finances its own rural electrification projects according 
to its developmental priorities. Each region also establishes its own electrification projects 
according to a pre-established evaluation methodology. The NEC supervises the achievements 
of the project at Central Government level. There is a specific process to be followed with 
regard to the evaluation and execution of rural electrification processes. In the first place, rural 
communities identify their need through Resident's Associations or similar committees, and 
request the Town Council to become beneficiaries. Secondly, Town Councils extend projects 
according to profitability, including budgets provided by distribution companies or local co-
operatives. In the third place, the REP secretariat makes revisions to the projects according to a 
General Evaluation Methodology provided by the Ministry (Duhart, 2003). 
The electrification drive has the additional objectives of contributing to the improvement of 
Development Indicators in the poorest regions of the country, by coordinating the efforts of the 
REP with other poverty-relief programs, particularly with: 
a) The Rural-Connection Programs of the Ministry of Education; 
b) The Rural Accident and Emergency Centres Reinforcement Program from the 
Ministry of Health; 
c) The Productive Development Programs from the poorest communities from the 
Solidarity and Social Investment Fund; 
d) The Ministry of Planning's Indigenous Development Support Programs; and 
e) The Rural Telephone Systems and Social Investment from the Ministry of Public 
Works, Transportation and Telecommunications 
Attention has also been gIven to off-grid systems. Project include the installation and 
maintenance of 6000 PV systems in households and isolated communities, the supply of energy 











Southern region. In addition there has to be the gradual replacement of diesel generators by 
hybrid systems based on the use of renewable energy (Duhart, 2000). 
Companies involved in these rural projects are requested annually to apply for a subsidy, 
presenting their projects to the regional governments which allocate the funds to those that 
score the best on certain criteria. These criteria include cost-benefit analysis, the amount of 
investment covered by the companies, as well as the social impacts. The subsidy funds are 
allocated by central government to the regions on the basis of two criteria: 
a) how much progress a region made in rural electrification in the previous year, 
and 
b) how many households still lack electricity. 
Where the cost of conventional electricity seems too expensive, alternative technologies are 
considered. The regional planning agency evaluates the projects, and only those with a positive 
social return but a negative private return are considered for subsidies. 
The results of the program seem largely positive. The coverage of electricity systems in rural 
areas increased from 53% in 1992 to 78% by 2000. The largest part of the funding supplied is 
due to a state contribution to rural electrification of US$ 112 million during 1995-1999. Private 
investment has totalled US$60 million thus far. Most of the projects involved the extension of 










Figure 1: Rural Electrification in Chile 
The ev olution of coverage of Chile's 
rural e Ie ctrification program 
Source: www.pIatts.com/fea tureslLa tinAmerican power/ chiIe.sh tmI 
31 
During 2000, the Administration of President Ricardo Lagos initiated the 2000-2005 Rural 
Electrification Programme. The goal was set of achieving a 90% rural household electrification 
coverage by 2005, nationally and in each region. Translated, it meant the electrification of 
100000 households, calling for an approximate investment of US$150 million. 
2.2.6 CONCLUSION 
As stated above, the main driver for change was to enhance efficiency in the market by means 
of establishing competition, and Chile chose the route of privatisation of considerable parts of 
their generation and distribution sector. An important aspect was tariff setting at marginal cost 
for small consumers and freedom of pricing for large consumers. 
Chile also put in place specific measures to achieve widened access to electricity in rural areas. 
It seems that the decentralised malUler in which Chile approached its electrification drive was 
the key to success in the rural electrification drive. A great deal could be learned from the way 
in which regions or provinces were granted some degree of self-identification of electrification 
needs, from provincial level to municipal level. The reason why Chile's electrification drive 











developmental and social goals as they were being determined at grass-roots level by local 
authorities. 
The continued electrification process also benefited from the state creating an independent 
regulatory body, which could oversee the entire sector, and deal with complaints from civil 
society. This aspect is very important in any attempt to address imbalances in electricity supply 
in any country. 
Figure 3 above speaks for Chile's continued and sustained efforts to supply its populace with 
electricity in a sustainable manner. It demonstrates that public benefits can be promoted - even 
in a privati sed and competitive industry, provided the state puts in place specific mechanisms. 













Argentina has a population of approximately 37 million people, During 2000, approximately 
98% of urban people and 70% of rural people had access to electricity. Thermal generation 
accounts for 57% of consumption, hydro 39% and nuclear approximately 4%. Since its 
military government yielded to democracy in 1983, Argentina has battled to restore economic 
stability, The opinion of policy-makers was that a program of state reform and the concomitant 
sale of state owned enterprises and assets would reduce the fiscal deficit, and generate funds for 
other sectors such as social welfare programs. Argentina embarked on a successful 
privatisation of its utilties - but many of the gains have subsequently been wiped out through 
macro-economic collapse (Bouille etal 2001). 
2.3.2 INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND FRAMEWORK 
The Argentine power sector reform and subsequent privatisation drive that was initiated in 
1989, was born out of the context of huge operational losses by state-owned enterprises. One 
example in this regard is the fact that 13 of the largest public companies in Argentina 
(excluding defence) had an operating deficit of $3.8 billion during 1989, and during the first 
half of 1990, the deficit grew another 35 percent, An inability to resolve these problems led to 
the 1992 privatisation program, as the electricity industry had deteriorated severely, It was also 
characterised by huge operational and financial difficulties, with constant threats of blackouts, 
worsening during dry spells affecting hydroelectric power generation. Electricity was 
expensive, often stolen or customers defaulting on payment. 
There was, however an incentive for future private stakeholders in the sector by the fact that 
between 1985 and 1991 net electricity production increased by 19 percent. In 199 L just prior 
to the advent of sector restructuring and privatisation, the Argentine electricity industry 
consisted of four federal utilities and two bi-national agencies shared with Paraguay and 
Uruguay respectively (mainly large hydroelectric plants). Additional to these were 19 
provincial utilities and several electricity co-operatives. One of the four federal utilities 
generated and distributed electricity to the greater Buenos Aires and La Plata area. Another one 
served the balance of the country's needs for power generation and transmission. The 
hydroelectric power generators from Southern Argentina were overseen by the third, and the 
fourth oversaw nuclear power generation plants. Since 1992, at least some part of the first three 











The first three of the federally-owned electricity companies In line to be restructured and 
privati sed were responsible for about 80 percent of the country's electricity supply. These 
companies were Segba, Ayee and Hidronor. Segba served the greater Buenos Aires area and 
before privatisation, it was restructured by vertical separation, and to some extent, horizontally. 
Power generation was separated from transmission and distribution. This process was followed 
by the constituent generation facilities being separated from one another resulting in six 
compames. The transmission and distribution activities were also separated with the 
transmission assets being combined with those of Ayee and Hidronor. A single high-voltage 
transmission company was created, as well as six regional transmission companies. Segba's 
distribution assets were separated into three companies, serving northern and southern Buenos 
Aires and La Plata respectively. Privatisation of Segba began during 1992 with the sale of two 
power generators, followed by the sale of the two distribution companies during the same year. 
The sale of the remaining three generation companies, as well as the high-voltage transmission 
company Transener followed soon. 
Ayee, the second federal company privatised had transmission and generation assets 
nationwide. The restructuring of Ayee also separated the generation and transmission activities, 
as well as dividing the generation facilities from one another. A total of 12 generation 
companies were created and the transmission assets were combined with Segba and Hidronor. 
The third federal electricity company to be restructured and privati sed was Hidronor, which 
oversaw several hydroelectric power generation activities in the southern part of the country. 
Hidronor's primary assets were four hydroelectric power facilities and each was restructured 
into a separate company and then privatised. As mentioned the transmission assets were 
combined with those of the first two companies. 
The nuclear electricity assets were restructured in July 1994, with the functions of the original 
nuclear agency being divided into three distinct entities. These entities consist of a company 
with generation assets, the nuclear regulatory agency which will remain government-owned, 
and the federal nuclear research organisation which will remain government-owned as well. 
The two bi-national hydroelectric facilities are still government owned. After the onset of the 











companIes began. However, up to early 1997, relatively few of these companIes were 
privati sed (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/pgernlelectric/ch4.html). 
2.3.3.1 REGULATION 
The passage of Law No. 23696 of 1989 created the legal basis for the restructuring and 
privatization of the sector, and was also called the Law of State Reform. This law directed the 
Executive office to reorganise and privatise public enterprises. Decree No. 634/91 of 1991 
issued by the Ministry of Economy, implemented law No. 23696. This decree provided the 
guidelines for unbundling the electricity sector activities, as well as for private participation in 
generation, transmission, distribution and dispatch activities. This law also defined the rights 
and obligations of providers of each area of service. It also directed the establishment of a new 
sector regulatory entity and of the bulk power market, including a spot market and outlined the 
privatisation schedule and plan. The Electricity Regulation Act of 1992 was actually the 
keystone for the ambitious reform and privatisation of the sector. This law restructured and 
reorganised the sector, and provided for the privatisation of almost all commercial activities 
carried out by federally owned enterprises. The law also established the regulatory entity, as 
well as other institutional authorities in the sector, the administration of the wholesale power 
market, pricing in the spot market, tariff-setting in regulated areas, and evaluating assets to be 
privatised (www.iadb.org/sds/docIl846eng.pdf). 
The reform of the Argentine electricity sector was heavily influenced by experience in Chile 
and the United Kingdom. The federal regulator established to oversee the electricity sector is 
ENRE - regulating all segments of the electricity industry, most extensively the transmission 
and distribution sectors. It also mediates disputes between electricity companies, as well as 
enforcing federal laws, regulations and concession terms. ENRE also establishes a standard of 
service delivery that distribution companies must meet and sets the maximum price level that 
transmission and distribution companies may charge for their services. ENRE also oversees 
CAMMESA (Compania Administradoro del Mercado Mayorista Electrico SA), the operator of 
the wholesale electricity market, as well as the generation companies, although these are not 
subject to price-cap regulation (Estache 1997, p.2-3). 
The structure of ENRE consists of a government-appointed board of five directors. The 
recruitment of the president, and vice president and one director are based on public job 
advertisements. The remaining two directors are selected from a short list proposed by the 











• To determine the basis and criteria for assigning concessions; 
• To enforce the regulatory framework, contracts and public service obligations; 
• To issue regulations on safety, technical procedures and norms and the monitoring of 
the compliance thereto; 
• To monitor billing methods and the control and use of meters, reconnection of service, 
access and quality of service; 
• Defining the basis for calculating tariffs and ensuring compliance; 
• Making public the general principles regulated entities must follow to avoid 
discrimination among consumers; 
• Organise public hearings; 
• The regulation of proceedings to institute sanction and penalties, taking relevant issued 
to court, and to issue an annual report and recommend policy actions. 
ENRE has its own funding sources, sufficient to perform its task, and is endowed with a 
technically competent and relatively small staff (less than 100). It is also accountable to both 
the legislative and executive branches of government (Estache 1997, p.2-3). 
As a private, non-profit company, CAMMESA has the task of operating the generation 
dispatch, power flows and the entire administration of wholesale transactions. The high-voltage 
national network is operated by a regulated private concession, Transener SA. Six other private 
transmission companies are concession holders to operate and maintain high voltage lines in 
regional areas. There are five principles regulating transmission. Firstly, monopoly rights to 
operate the existing network. Secondly, they are prohibited from selling or buying energy, and 
thirdly open access is ensured to sellers and buyers. Fourthly, there is periodic competition for 
the concession rights, and fifthly there is incentive-based regulation of prices and quality 
(Abdala & Charnbouleyron, 1999, p.2) 
Currently, electricity generation in Argentina is unregulated with no need for generators to 
obtain permission prior to building or adding to generating facilities. When it comes to selling 
electricity, the generators operate in two markets. In one market they can contract to sell their 
output among themselves and directly to distributors and large customers, at any price that both 
parties agree on. In the second market, they can supply energy in the spot market at marginal 
prices according to demand. Transmission and distribution companies can propose a change in 
rates, which must be approved by ENRE, and they must obtain permits from ENRE to build, 











privileges status quo tariffs and regulation policy. This regulatory process, which entails 
hearings and open challenges, essentially gives companies a veto over new policy and makes 
regulatory policy predictable (Heller & McCubbins 1996). 
2.3.4 INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITION AND PRIV A TISATION 
Privatised companies were sold through an auction process. With this process, firms and 
consortia were pre-qualified and put on a short list of bidders and those selected as bidders 
submitted a two-part bid. The first part of the bid was a technical offer and firms not meeting 
requirements were eliminated. The second part of the process contained the financial offers and 
winners either offered the highest price for the concession offered or agreed to provide and 
minimum level of service at the lowest price. As much as 90% of formerly government-owned 
companies were sold, with employees receiving 10% of the companies and the federal 
government retaining no ownership. The conventional electricity facilities were sold 
separately, making each privatised generation unit an independent power producer. The 
thermal generation facilities were sold outright, while concessions were awarded for the 
hydroelectric plants. The majority of the privatised generation capacity was purchased by 
foreign companies. The smaller generation facilities were purchased by domestic companies as 
foreign companies showed no interest In them (http://www.eia.doe.gov/ emeul 
pgem/electric/ch4.html). 
Generation companies are, prohibited from owning majority shares in transmission facilities, 
and are also restricted to being responsible for a maximum of 10 percent of the national 
electricity sales volume. The federal government has restricted its participation in the 
electricity market to the regulatory, oversight and policy making activities. The federal 
government's holding in the commercial sector is limited to the operation of the international 
hydropower project, and to the nuclear plant (\\ww.iadb.org/sds/doc/1846eng.pdf). 
The success of these reforms has now been compromised by Argentina's macro-economic crisis. 
The "pesofication" of the economy and the massive devaluation has created an untenable situation 
for foreign investors. Government has frozen tariffs, ENRE is moribund and much needed new 
investment has dried up. It remains to be seen how successful government renegotiations with the 
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2.3.5 ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 
Only a small portion of the country's population is not electrified, less than 5%. The level of 
electrification in more isolated regions is around 70%. In order to address this situation a 
special program (P AEPRA) was created in 1995 to promote the provision of electricity to 
remote areas. The PAEPRA program's aim is to promote electricity supply to 314 000 
households within six years in sixteen provinces. The provincial governments are supposed to 
fund the projects, but in reality prefer grid extensions for political reasons (Covarrubias & 
Reiche, 2000, p.84-87). 
Concessions are granted to private bidders that require the lowest subsidy for serving a given 
area. The individual concessions are expected to electrify a rural market of between 3 000 and 
25 000 consumers and use solar, wind, mini- and micro-hydropower, and other renewable 
energy technologies. The concession contracts are designed to maximise private investment 
and minimise public subsidies. Concessionaires are required to provide service to customers 
who ask for it. A subsidy is paid to the concessionaire and the customer. It is means-based and 
depends on the energy service level and chosen technology. Investment in renewable 
technology is rewarded by paying higher subsidies for renewable energy options. The subsidy 
can cover a share of the installation cost, and for the very poor, a share of the monthly tariff. 
Subsidies will however, decline over the fifteen-year concession period. 
Government also provides subsidies for low-income pensioners in some distribution areas. The 
subsidy was valued at about 50% of the normal tariff, being paid out of the national treasury. 
During the last three years, the distribution companies serving Buenos Aires have regularised 
services for more than three million people with the help of government subsidies. 
Power sector reform has indeed created a significant number of public benefits, such as 
improved quality of service in urban areas, reductions in technical and non-technical losses, 
supply expansion and increased efficiency. However, there have also been a number of 
problems. 
• Expanding access to isolated rural areas nationally the electrification rate was 91 % 
before reforms were implemented and by 2000 had risen to 95%. This improvement 
was largely due to the formalisation of previously illegal connection in urban suburban 
areas rather than true expansion in rural areas. Approximately 30% of the population in 
isolated areas remain unconnected as privatisation did not make electrification of these 











communities. Distributors maximise their returns on investment by delivering 
electricity at the lowest average cost and so most distributors made investments in 
densely populated areas where returns are highest. In spite of the establishment of 
P AEPRA, by 1999 the program fell short of its announced goals. The principal 
problems encountered by PAEPRA included provincial governments' unwillingness to 
contribute subsidy payments to concession holders, as well as a lack of interest from 
commercial entities. It is clear that federal efforts to provide rural electricity require 
larger subsidies and concession designs that go beyond what can be achieved by the 
adaptation of existing models. 
• Connection of poor urban households in urban areas privatisation of distribution 
affected the lowest-income consumers. Those least able to pay - illegally connected 
consumers concentrated in urban slums - were initially cut off from service. Loans 
from the International Finance Corporation to distribution companies enhanced the 
efficiency of the system that made electricity theft more difficult. These changes 
ensured the economic viability of distribution companies, but ignored the problem of 
how to provide basic electricity services to those without the economic resources. 
Several court cases ensued after the cut-off of illegal consumers on the basis that 
privatisation deprived a significant slice of the population of basic services, even if they 
were obtained illegally. As a response the federal government, the Province of Buenos 
Aires and two distribution companies (EDENOR and EDESUR) entered into the "Four-
Year Framework Agreement". As part of this agreement, the federal government, the 
Buenos Aires provincial government and municipalities reimbursed the companies for 
unpaid balances associated with illegal connections. The companies waived any claims 
that accrued on unpaid bills since 1992, pledged to install 1 0 000 meters a month in 
low-income areas and agreed to conduct a household census. As a result roughly 
650 000 users were formally connected to the network. Mostly, consumption by low-
income communities unable to pay for electricity is paid by municipal governments, 
and cities generally recoup these expenditures by imposing a tax on household 
electricity consumption. The National Electricity Fund established by the National 
Electricity Act (Law 24065) capitalised on a tax on electricity sales in the wholesale 
market. Sixty percent of these tax revenues are distributed to provinces that adhere to 
the federal scheme for distribution tariffs to subsidise consumers, the remaining 40% is 
directed to electricity development in the interior. 
• The impacts of electricity pricing on low-income consumers by 1995 electricity 











users, but almost no mention is being made of how these pnce reductions were 
distributed among income or consumption classes. One study indicated that between 
1991 and 1998 residential and industrial consumers with the highest consumption levels 
experienced the largest price reductions (71 % and 44% respectively). Low-
consumption households generally experienced only marginal price declines (1.6%). 
The new regulatory framework required electricity services to reflect the cost of supply 
and distribution costs are in inverse proportion to the quantity and voltage of supply. 
Thus, consumers with low consumption paid more relatively to industrial and high 
residential consumers. Five-year fixed electricity supply contracts were bundled with 
the distribution concessions when they were initially privati sed. These long-term price 
contracts were designed to buffer the sector against price volatility faced by potential 
investors. These contracts covered up to 50% of projected demand, and as a result, 
although wholesale prices fell, much of the savings were not passed on to residential 
consumers. 
• Investments in renewable energy - for the better part of the 1990's private 
investments mostly went to upgrading or building of gas-fired power plants and 
developing natural gas fields and pipelines. Neither the creation of distributed power 
concessions under P AEPRA nor the subsidies offered by international donors proved 
sufficient to draw investment to renewable energy for distributed power (Bouille et aI, 
200 I p.I-45). 
2.3.6 CONCLUSION 
Thus, the main drivers for power sector reform in Argentina, and the subsequent privatisation 
drive initiated in 1989, was mostly to correct the huge operational losses by state-owned 
enterprises and to address the huge deficits continuing to plague the power sector. Where other 
countries stated enhanced public benefits and access to electricity as key drivers, this was not 
the case here. The sector was restructured text-book-like by unbundling of the generation, 
transmission and distribution activities. It must be said that the process was done in a coherent 
way by means of bidding documents, contract terms and conditions being prepared by 
competent legal advisors. As much as 90% of formerly government-owned companies were 
sold in a relatively short time by means of a bidding process. 
The structural reform process of the power sector took the form of the vertical separation of the 











considered to be a competitive sector, and was broken up into twenty-five business units that 
were sold separately to private owners. A spot market was created which is open to any 
generator and this market matches supply and demand with an hourly price, allowing 
distributors and large users to buy power from any generator of their choice. Transmission was 
considered a natural monopoly, but the government introduced competition by way of 
auctioning contractual rights to deliver these services. Transener the main transmission 
company - and four of the five regional transmission companies have been privatised. There 
are twenty-two main distribution companies - most under provincial government jurisdiction. 
Distribution is also considered a natural monopoly although distributors buy electricity in a 
competitive spot market and face competition from large users allowed to buy directly from 
generators (Estache & Rodriguez-Pardina, 1996, p.2). 
Argentina has the benefit of having a very high urban electrification rate of 95% and a rural rate 
of 70%.. Thus, power sector reform and its influence on access to electricity has more bearing 
on rural access to electricity than urban electricity access. As mentioned, the provision of rural 
electricity is done through a bidding process, with concessions granted to private bidders that 
require the lowest subsidy for serving a specific area. The concession contracts were designed 
to maximise private investment and minimise public subsidies. Government also provides 
subsidised electricity to low-income pensioners. 
Provincial governments are supposed to fund decentralised electrification to remote areas, but 
often prefer to wait for grid-extensions for financial and political reasons. A significant 
problem was created by the fact that urban areas benefited the most from aspects such as 
improved quality of service and a reduction in technical and non-technical losses. It is thus 
clear that there was no public benefits agenda worked into the reform efforts, but second 
generation reform efforts attempted to address this situation. However, they fell short of 
creating coherent changes for the poor and rural users, as the reforms consisted mostly of 
adjustments to the competitive and regulated markets. It is very clear that the reform process in 
Argentina lacked severe political will to enhance access to electricity by the communities that 
needed it most. The biggest concern by government was to attract private investment to service 
certain loan agreements. Public interest is implied in the power sector refom1 documentation, 












Due to the reform efforts, by 1995 wholesale electricity prices in the wholesale market had 
fallen by more than 50% for large and wholesale users, none of these pricing benefits were 
carried over to small, especially poor users The 1990's saw private investment going into the 
upgrade of gas-fired plants, and the distributed power concessions offered by PAEPRA for the 
installation of renewable energy sources in remote areas were ignored. It is thus clear that the 
poor were mostly negatively affected by the process and the rich were the greatest beneficiaries, 
and there should have been a system of transfer mechanisms favouring the poor by means of 
cross-subsidies. The failure of the reform effort to ensure public benefit and enhance access to 
electricity to poor and remote users are ascribed here as a huge failure in the design and 
execution of regulatory practice. The economic crisis did playa substantial part in Argentina's 
macro-economic and power sector, but in comparison to the case of Chile, it is clear that 












CHAPTER THREE - AFRICA 
3.1 NAMIBIA 
3.1.1 OVERVIEW 
Namibia has an estimated population of 2 million people, which are largely dispersed in rural 
areas, with approximately 2.3 persons per square kilometre. Only 28% of the population is 
considered urbanised. Past electricity supply development in Namibia was mainly in response 
to industrial and urban demand (U thoni & D larnini, 2001). 
Namibia has one mam electricity utility, NamPower, which is responsible for generation, 
transmission and bulk supply to municipalities. Electricity imports accounted for more than 
half of total consumption. The coal power generation plant - the Van Eck Power Plant in 
Windhoek, has a capacity of 120MW, but is mainly used as a back~up facility in case of 
shortages in imports. Most power is generated from the 240 MW Ruacana hydro power station 
on the Kunene River. The Ruacana generation facility output varies throughout the year 
according to seasonal rainfall. The Eastern Caprivi is supplied by a 66 kV line from Zambia, 
securing a supply of approximately 3MW. (Uthoni & Dlamini, 2001). 
The electricity supply industry in Namibia faces a number of challenges, amounting to: 
• A loss of economies of scale; 
• Varying tariff structures, resulting in an uneven playing field; 
• Neglect of the customer base which led to low quality of supply levels and service; 
• A severe shortage of skilled staff; 
• A difference in financial performance of distributors; 
• An inability for distributors to plan, finance and sustain electrification programmes. 
• Pre~reform NamPower generation acted as a generation oligopoly. NamPower was also 
responsible for transmission to local authority distributors 
• (No author~http://pdf. wrLorg/powerpolitics _chapS. pdf., 2001 , p.l ). 
The White Paper on energy policy was developed by the national energy policy committee and 
approved by the Cabinet in May 1998. The Directorate of Energy under the Ministry and 
Mines and Energy IS the mam government body responsible for the sector. 











Figure 3- Before Restructuring Efforts 
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Source: Shilamba, 2000 
3.1.2 REGULATION 
The Electricity Control Board (ECB) IS a statutory authority established in terms of the 
Electricity Act (Act 2 of 2000). It has the core responsibility of regulating electricity 
generation, transmission, distribution, supply, import and export. In the execution of its 
functions the affairs of the ECB are managed by a Technical Secretariat headed by a Chief 
Executive Officer. The Board consists of five members who must be appointed by the Minister 
from amongst persons who have appropriate expertise in one or more of the sectors of the 
electricity industry, law, economics or environmental issues (Electricity Act 2000). 
The main activities of ECB are: 
• Information collection and establishment of a database; 
• Formalise the licensing system and procedures; 
• Establish electrification targets as part of licensing requirements; 
• Commence review of electricity prices and development of a new national tariff system; 
• Formalise processes and procedures for monitoring and control of licences; 
• Establish necessary rules for operation of the single-buyer model; and 











3.1.3 INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
The 1998 White Paper on Energy Policy states the following as core principals of the electricity 
sector: 
• Granting customers the right to choose their electricity supplier; 
• Introducing competition in the industry; 
• The creation of a transmission system which is non-discriminatory and ensuring access 
to the transmission system; 
• Encouraging private sector participation in the industry; 
• Equate non-conventional energy sources with conventional ones; 
• Ring-fencing separate power stations into a number of companies (SAD-ELEC, 
2001). 
The reform of the Namibian power sector commenced with phase I, which consisted of a 
detailed investigation into the performance of the ESI, and relevant international experiences. 
This phase was completed in March 1998. Phase II entailed the evaluation of a limited number 
of possible restructuring options, with particular focus on rationalisation of the distribution 
sector. This phase was completed in July 1998. A subsequent Consultation Phase consisted of 
the sharing of the results and recommendations of the first two phases, with a broad range of 
stakeholders, in order to fully inform them of the reasons for change. This phase was 
concluded in April 1999. Phase III consisted of taking the views and positions of the various 
stakeholders into consideration, and making recommendations regarding key policies and 
implementation. The outcome of these phases was the Electricity Act of 2000 (SAD-ELEC, 
2001). 
At a meeting of stakeholders in the Namibian power sector in July 2000, it was generally 
agreed that the Single Buyer model should be followed, but with the following elements: 
• The development of IPP's in order to export power at some stage; 
• NamPower should not be excluded from participating in IPP developments; 
• The Electricity Control Board or competition authorities should monitor IPP 
developments and PPA's to ensure NamPower's participation is not to the detriment of 
Namibian customers; 












• All distributors and eligible large users must purchase electricity from the Single 
Buyers, except in the case of large users buying directly; 
• All end-users must purchase power from their local distribution agency, with the 
exception of large individual users using more than 5MW at a single point or where the 
local distributor waives the right of supply (SAD-ELEC, 2001). 
The recommended route for reform was to start off with creating the Single-Buyer model, 
together with Southern African Power Pool imports, and the Kudu projects. In addition, it 
entailed: 
• The completion of Economic and Technical Regulations, as well as amendments to the 
Electricity Act; 
• Implementation of a National Tariff Study; 
• Creation of the Single Buyer Office (in Nampower); 
• Completion of the Grid Code; 
• The establishment of the Regional Electricity Distributors (REDs) by 2005; 
• Issue of long-term distribution licences to REDs; 
• Setting up of quality of supply and service standards; 
• Transformation of the wholesale and retail market by 2011 
(Shilamba, 2002). 
The Cabinet-approved ESI Restructuring Recommendations are: 
Market Restructuring 
The short to medium term solution with the recommended Single-Buyer ~odel. NamPower 
has the lead responsibility, with the involvement of the ECB, to separate the systems operation 
and transmission network operations from generation and distribution. Medium-term activities 
include the separation of network operations and market operation, including full separation of 
transmission network charges from energy charges, with regulatory control over the 
transmission network operation (SAD-ELEC 2001). 
Distribution Restructuring 











• The restructuring proposals to focus on the customer base, network characteristics and 
geographic areas; 
• The distribution industry being gradually moved towards the establishment of RED's as 
the basic distributor structure; 
• The financial viability of licensed distributors being ensured; 
• Mechanisms to be put in place to safeguard local authority revenue requirements in a 
restructured distribution industry; 
• The rationalisation of the industry being conducive to private sector participation; 
• Defining a distribution area to generally only have one supplier until retail competition 
materialises in future; 
• With the exception of a limited number of large users, customers in a defined area are to 
be supplied from the licensed distributor in that area; 
The distribution industry rationalisation should be voluntary, but will be guided by policy and 
rulings of the ECB (SAD-ELEC, 2001). 
Distribution restructuring in Northern Namibia 
As a short-term measure, stakeholders in the North have established a Northern Namibian 
Working Group (NNWG) under the leadership of the Ministry of Mines and Energy. The 
NNWG is tasked with assisting the Government in defining and implementing a Regional 
Electricity Distribution Company (RED) for this region. The NNWG also assists government 
in designing and developing a detailed proposal for the creation, establishment and 
operationalisation of the Northern RED. It assists Government in communication with 
stakeholders for the smooth transition from the existing EST to the RED. The medium term 
objective consists of the decision to formalise and structure the RED as a company. The 
Northern RED became operational during the second half of 200 1 (SAD-ELEC, 2001). 
Distribution restructuring in the Erongo Region 
As a short term measure, stakeholders have approved a step-by-step approach towards 
restructuring which established a regional distributor in Erongo. The Regional stakeholders 
reviewed a draft constitution for a voluntary organisation - the Management Coordination 
Committee (MCC) - to undertake the activities. The main Phase I activities established the 
representative organisation of the ESI in the Erongo Region, to improve and develop the ESI of 
the region, collect and disseminate statistics on supply, facilitate and coordinate interaction 











included the establishment of service agreements between members, and this was done by July 
2001 with the involvement of the MCC, stakeholders and ECB. It also included the 
transformation of the MCC into the Erongo Regional Distribution Company (EREDCo), and 
the establishment of Agency agreements with distributors in the region. Long-term objectives 
include the consolidation of all distribution into EREDCo, possibly inviting private 
participation (SAD-ELEC, 200 1). 
Distribution restructuring in the Central and Southern Regions 
The establishment of regional distributor(s) in these areas was not recommended in the short 
term, although it remains a longer-term goal. MRLGH's direct involvement should be phased 
out, either by expanding existing local authority responsibilities to also include nearby 
settlements, or by private operations to tender for service and operation contracts for those 
areas. Existing distributors with available capacity are encouraged to pursue ways of providing 
services on a commercial basis to other distributors experiencing problems. A stakeholder 
Working Group is proposed to establish and promote restructuring initiatives and to resource 
the process. Specific activities are recommended to stimulate voluntary restructuring and to 
create a level playing field, including amongst others, ring-fencing of the electricity businesses. 
In addition, mechanisms should be explored for service provision between stakeholders (SAD-
ELEC, 200 1 ). 
The Northern Electricity Distribution Company (Nored) has been granted a 25-year supply and 
distribution licence by the Electricity Control Board (ECB), effective from 13 March 2003. It 
is estimated that the number of Nored's customer base had grown from 15 000 in 2001 to 
24900 in 2003. Nored has entered into a service agreement with NamPower to maintain the 
transmission network at Katima Mulilo 
(No author-www.nampower.com.nalNamPower/pr_show.asp?r=193). 
Namibia has experimented in the past with private participation in distribution. Northern 
Electricity was contracted in 1996 to undertake electricity distribution in the northern regions. It 
was successful in reducing losses and restoring financial viability. It also increased connections 
from 5000 to 15000. However, as a result of political pressures and the desire of local 
authorities to remain involved in electricity provision, the experiment came to an end and 











Nampower also established a separate distribution company. Premier Electric was established 
on 23 August 1999 by Cabinet Resolution as a subsidiary to NamPower to fulfil the objectives 
of: 
• Establishing distribution networks in towns, villages and communities where electricity 
is not yet available; 
• Installing solar PV systems where grid electrification is not economically viable; 
• Setting up expertise to render services in the electrical maintenance and operational 
fields; 
• Training people to render specialised electrical engineering services; 
• Establishing contracts with municipalities, towns and village councils to operate and 
maintain their electricity distribution system; 
• Enhancing and assisting with the creation of regional electricity distributors 
(www.esi.co.zallast/ESC12002/ESI12002_023_I.htm). 
Premier Electric established partnerships with the Oshakati Premier Electric and Otavi 
Electrical Company. However, a number of operational and financial problems arose within 
Premier Electric and it has been folded back into Nampower as an operating division. 
(www.esi.co.zallast/ESI_1_2002/ESII2002_023_I.htm). 
3.1.4 ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY AND ELECTRIFICATION 
Since independence, Government has embarked on a comprehensive rural electrification 
programme aimed at increasing access to electricity among the rural population in order to 
enhance economic development, equitable distribution of resources and social upliftment. The 
goal was to reduce the daily household chores performed by rural women, especially by 
reducing the time spent collecting firewood. However, this is not a straightforward process. 
According to Uthoni & Dlamini (2001), even households who are electrified by grid do not 
switch to electricity for all desired energy services. They still use wood fuel or gas for cooking. 
Uthoni & Dlamini (2001) are of the opinion that off-grid technologies are often the only option 
for the electrification of small and remote settlements. They estimate the current installed 
power generation capacity of off-grid technologies to be around 2 MW. They also add that: 
"The overall objective of the rural electrification programme is to connect socio-economic 
centres to the grid" 











The present status of electrification is estimated at 75% in urban areas and 9% in rural areas. 
Namibia's 1998 White Paper on Energy Policy suggests electrification targets of 90% and 25% 
respectively by 2010. 
The government's rural electrification programme was initially supported by funding from the 
Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD), and because of its success Government 
annually commits between N$20 million and N$30 million to rural electrification. This has 
recently been enhanced by a further N$20 million per year from a donor, who also funded a 
new 400 kV inter-connector with South Africa. Despite high connection costs due to large 
distances and low popUlation densities, the rural electrification programme has been highly 
successful. Prepayment metering, which together with insulated overhead conductor 
technology has enabled the widespread connection of even the most basic house structures. 
While all main centres in the country's rural areas have been electrified during the past 10 years 
(remote settlements having been provided with diesel powered mini-grids), there are 
approximately 2800 rural settlements that remain to be electrified. The Rural Electricity 
Distribution Master Plan (REDMP) , released in November 2000, prioritises these settlements 
and provides annual electrification schedules for the next 20 years, based on a budgetary 
allocation of almost N$50 million per year. Settlements that will remain remote from the grid 
for some time are dealt with in the parallel off-grid electrification programme, with an annual 
budget of around N$5 million. The software-based master plan co-ordinates these two 
programmes and enables easy adjustment of the electrification schedules if assumptions and 
parameters change (Tobich & Muller, 2000). 
Prioritisation of centres for electrification is done in consultation with regional offices. During 
1992 and 1993 the Western Kavango Region was electrified, followed by the Eastern Kavango 
region in 1993 and 1994. The electrification programme covered parts of the Otjozandjupa and 
Omaheke regions in 1994 and 1995, and most main centres in the Hardap and Karas regions 
were electrified between 1995 and 1998. The first phase of rural electrification in the Caprivi 
Region took place in 1995 and 1996, with the Oshikoto, o han gwen a, Oshana and Omusati 
regions benefiting from a second phase during 1997. Larger settlements in Enongo and Kunene 
Regions were electrified in 1998 and 1999, during which period the third phase of rural 
electrification of the Oshikoto, Ohangwena, Oshana and Amusati regions was implemented. 
Consumers located within a radius of 500 metres from the distribution transformers are offered 










Since the start of the rural electrification projects in the country, an estimated 15% of rural 
communities had access to electricity. The programme has connected approximately 9700 rural 
households and 400 rural towns, villages and settlements. The rural electrification programme 
has to date been grant-financed by the Namibian government, the Norwegian government and 
NamPower. NamPower confirms that within the next 10 years it aims to reach 25% of the rural 
popUlation. 
In ex-post analyses it became obvious that the electricity consumption per capita in newly 
electrified villages remains very low, covering only the basic needs for lightning, radio and TV 
and, to a very limited extent only, for cooling and other domestic applications. This low 
demand and the dispersed structure of settlements are limiting factors for the economic viability 
of rural electrification programmes based on grid extension. As a result, such rural 
electrification has to be complemented by decentralised technologies, and it was decided by 
MME to develop and test an appropriate dissemination strategy for solar home systems based 
on the needs and means of rural communities. (Muller & Tobich, 2000). Therefore parallel to 
the grid electrification efforts, the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) has instituted a 
revolving credit fund for solar home systems in an effort to afford remote rural households the 
opportunity to acquire basic electrification in their homes. This facility, initiated in 1996, falls 
under the management of the Namibia Development Corporation, and provides loans at low 
interest rates to purchasers of the systems. The project is called "Home Power". During the 
pilot phase of the project, the aim was to provide loans at 5% interest rate payable over a 
maximum period of 5 years. A down-payment of 20% of the total system costs and minimum 
annual income of N$ 15 000, were pert of the requirements to qualify for the loan. The third 
phase of the "Home Power" project is underway and allows its beneficiaries to purchase high 
quality solar home systems of various sizes at a reduced deposit of 10% with the same interest 
and payback rates. The larger systems now include an inverter for AC applications. A major 
advantage is the fact that the price includes installation, transport and insurance over 5 years 
and the systems are thus devoid any further hidden costs, and correct installation is ensured. 
Customers are buying the system and have the responsibility of maintaining them. By February 
2001, 456 systems had been installed in Namibia. Two villages in the Caprivi and Karanga 
Regions were electrified by solar panels in 2000, with 80% of the equipment donated by the 
Indian government. Parallel to this initiative, government has installed large solar energy 
systems in more than 30 schools and clinics across Namibia. LPG cooking appliances are also 
promoted throughout the project. In 2000, the Minister of Mines and Energy initiated two 











funding for rural electrification has come from government. NamPower made a significant 
financial contribution. According tot the REMP, a total of 230 off~grid localities have been 
identified to be electrified between 2003 and 2008 
( www.klausdierks.comlEnergy/Regulated_energy.htm ). 
The next phase of rural electrification is to cater for substantially smaller and more remote 
settlements and farms. Cost-effectiveness as well as financial and economical feasibility are 
critical factors in allocating available funds in an equitable manner among the unelectrified 
localities. 
3.1.5. CONCLUSION 
Power sector reform in Namibia has focused on the distribution sector. An early experiment 
with private participation was successful in terms of improved technical and financial 
performance and in terms of increased connections. Unfortunately it was terminated because of 
political reasons. Efforts are now being made to rationalise the distribution sector into a limited 
number of REDs - that will also be responsible for electrification. 
Namibia is one of those countries that truly faced a huge challenge in terms of electrification 
after independence largely due to the fact that only 28% of the population is urbanised. To 
expand electricity to rural areas by grid implies a huge financial commitment. 
Important to note is the fact that a fund was set up in an effort to afford remote rural households 
the opportunity to acquire basic electrification. This fact demonstrates considerable political 
will from government to supply energy to its remote areas. In addition, Government annually 
commits up to N$30 million to address the rural electrification backlog. Despite the high 
connection costs due to large distances, and low population densities, the rural electrification 
programme has been highly successful. However, approximately 2800 rural settlements remain 
to be electrified, but indications are that government has committed itself to address this 
situation by developing the Rural Electricity Distribution Master Plan. While the grid has 
been extended to a number of rural areas, and while others have been recipients of solar home 
systems, the majority of the rural population remain without electricity. It also became clear 
that electricity consumption per capita in newly electrified villages remains very low, covering 













The economic reforms implemented by the government in Uganda since 1987, together with a 
situation of relative political stability, have contributed to economic growth rates averaging 6% 
per annum during the last decade. Inflation rates have decreased from 240% in 1988, to below 
10% per annum at present. A tax and tariff regime that allows sustained private sector-led 
growth has led to substantial private investment. The Government has also extended and 
improved the country's infrastructure networks in water, electricity and transport, and has 
embarked on utility reform programs (Nyirinkindi, 2003). 
Since colonial times, Uganda has only been supplied with a modem energy infrastructure in a 
few planned town areas, which were meant to accommodate Government civil servants. Areas 
with poor communities were not provided for. For a substantial time, Government did not have 
the capacity to build any energy infrastructure. In the past, domestic consumers enjoyed an 
electricity subsidy for the initial 200 units. The result has been that more than 37% of the 
utility customers limit their consumption only to the amount of energy offered by the lifeline 
tariff, thus seriously affecting the paying customer base of the utility (Kyokutamba, 1999, p2-
66). 
The Ministry of Energy is responsible for energy sector policy and strategy while the Ministry 
of Finance supervises and controls the performance of public enterprises. Until the end of 
2000, the Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) was the national utility for electricity supply. 
3.2.2 INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND REFORM INITIATIVES 
Uganda's main sources of power are the Owen Falls Hydro Power Station (l80MW) and the 
Owen Falls Extension (l20MW). Electricity supplied by the national grid covers only about 
5% of the population, and only 20% of the urban population is grid-connected. Total electricity 
consumption is divided amongst the residential sector (55%), the commercial and general 
sectors (25%), and the industrial sector (20%). The total population of Uganda is about 25 












Currently only about 225 000 households have access to electricity, of which less than half is 
provided through the national grid. The remainder of energy supply is from household 
generators, car batteries or solar photovoltaic units. Independent studies commissioned by the 
Utility Reform Unit (URU) indicate that at least one million people have the means to pay for 
electricity, but are not supplied with it. 
The electricity system is characterised by technical losses of up to 20% as well as high non-
technical losses. System breakdowns and load shedding lead to frequent power outages and 
voltage fluctuations. This situation has led to a condition where the utility could not earn an 
adequate rate of return, service its debt, or contribute significantly to the financing of further 
development. There is also some degree of corruption. A poorly-planned system of connecting 
new customers has led to a further overload of the system. The new connections have been 
affected without paying enough attention to load-balancing, and the low-voltage lines have 
been over-extended. Through the implementation of rigid enforcement of the monitoring of 
illegal connections and improved billing systems, collection has improved, reaching a level of 
83% in early 2003 (Nyirinkindi, 2003). 
The Uganda power sector is currently in a state of transition. Prior to power sector reform 
efforts in Uganda, the sector was publicly-owned and vertically integrated. Historically, the 
state-owned Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) was the sole electricity generator, as well as the 
only transmitter and distributor of energy en the country. 
Kabagambe-Kaliisa (1999) summarises the major problems in the power sector as: 
• Very poor reliability in the supply sector, characterised by extensive and increasing 
load-shedding and reduction in voltage; 
• Inadequate capital investment; 
• Poor commercial performance; 
• High technical and non-technical losses and low productivity; 
• An insufficient rate of connection of new customers. 
These characteristics were the drivers for Ugandan Power Sector Reform. 
3.2.3.1 REGULATION 
The Electricity Act of 1964 and the Public Enterprises Reform and Divestiture Statute of 1993 
were the only enacted legislation governing the electricity sector. As an interim measure, the 











power sector. The Electricity Reform Act was passed in October 1999 that allowed private 
investment and multiple operators in the system. The process of legal reform was largely 
dependent on the finalisation of the government's Strategic Plan for the Uganda Power Sector. 
In addition, it was aimed at the need to attract private sector investment to assist with capacity 
expansion. The main limitations in the sector addressed in the new Act are firstly the removal 
of the UEB's monopoly to generate, transmit, distribute and supply of electricity. Secondly, 
the UEB's powers to regulate the electricity supply sector had to be removed in order to avoid 
any conflict of interest, and also to create investor confidence in the electricity industry 
(Mugyenzi, 2000, p. 156-157). 
The purpose of the legislation is set out as follows: "it is desirable to improve the efficiency 
and availability of electricity services in Uganda, and whereas it is expedient to do so through 
increased private ownership of electricity resources and private provision of electricity services, 
increased competition in the bulk supply of electricity, and improved regulation electricity 
services. It is expedient to establish the Uganda Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA) as an 
autonomous agency of the government of Uganda empowered to administer the requirements 
of the Act in furtherance of the purposes thereor' (Mugyenzi, 2000, p.156). The Act 
established the ERA as the regulator over the electricity supply industry, and was to be funded 
from an initial grant from government, and thereafter from license fees, fines and penalties, 
grants and donations and from a levy on gross revenues from electricity sales by each licensee 
under the Act. No person may engage in the business of generating, transmitting or supplying 
electricity unless authorised by a licence framework. The ERA must also approve the electricity 
tariffs and may also approve investment programmes, performance and industry standards and 
codes of conduct (Mugyenzi, 2000, p. 156 -7). 
3.2.4 STRUCTURAL REFORM 
According to Mugyenzi (2000), the power sector reform process was initiated in 1985 with a 
proposal referred to as the Uganda Second Power Project. This involved the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of the Owen Falls Power Station, overhauling the transmission and distribution 
system, and training of the UEB and MNR staff with the aim at improving the electricity 
supply. The proposal included: 
• A Power Development Study of the electricity system; 
• Assessing the management structure of the organisation, as well as the manpower and 
training requirements of the UEB; 











• Review stores and vehicles workshop facilities and procedures; 
• Overseeing a feasibility study of electricity supply to Western Uganda; 
• Rehabilitating of the Kampala Network and a Household Energy Planning Programme; 
and 
• Studying the possibility of the extension to the Owen Falls Power Station (OFPS) 
(Mugyenzi, 2000, p.159). 
Some of the recommendations generated by the above have been implemented or are included 
in the Third Power Project. This was also in keeping with a 1989 ESMAP report which 
recommended an increased generation capacity and improvements in the Kampala distribution 
system. Other elements of the project included the construction of the 132 kV Jinja-Kampala 
double circuit line, support to the MNR, as well as the design for the hydro- project which was 
developed in 1993. A National Electrification Master Plan was formulated, but findings of the 
study were that the rehabilitation of the Owen Fall Power Station may only be sufficient for 
meeting demand until 1995. In addition, there was a lack of protective maintenance of the 
system, the problem of an ageing network, and that of diesel generation draining the UEB' s 
financial resources (Mugyenzi, 2000). 
The main drivers for reform of the power sector can firstly be found in the rapid economic 
growth, resulting in increased demand, especially industrial demand. In addition, there is the 
shortage of capital in the country to invest in generation and to expand the current 
infrastructure, and loans will further increase the country's debt burden and are therefore 
undesirable. The UEB's institutional structure limits the autonomy of management, allows a 
margin of inefficiency and does not provide sufficient reward for performance. It was 
established that the long-term strategy should involve the unbundling of the power system, the 
establishment of private, regulated, urban distribution companies, that the State should retain 
the electrification function. In addition, licensed IPP's should be allowed to supply electricity to 
industrial users. The reform policy is meant to open the generation segment to other generators, 
while the transmission segment remains under UEB control. 
In 1997, a comprehensive and detailed strategic plan was formulated by government for the 
transformation of the power sector into a financially viable electricity industry. This plan has 
been revised into the New Strategic Plan of 1999, designed to meet, as before, the objectives of: 
• Making the power sector financially viable and able to perform without subsidies from 











• Increasing the sector's efficiency; 
• Improving the sector's commercial performance; 
• Meeting the growing demand for electricity and increasing area coverage; 
• Improving reliability and quality of supply; 
• Attracting private capital and entrepreneurs 
The major elements of reform are: 
• The formation and implementation of the Power Sector Strategic Plan; 
• Internally reforming the UEB; 
• Promoting private sector participation; 
• Expanding power export opportunities; 
• Focus on rural electrification (Kabagamle-Kaliisa 1999). 
The UEB was to be unbundled, and each of the three components would operate as a separate, 
self-accounting entity 
Generation . The strategy for generation 1S to mcrease the scope of competition in the 
provision of new generation capacity or in the running of existing generation assets. New 
generation capacity will be provided competitively by the private sector through IPPs. Both the 
existing Owen Falls Power Station and the Owen Falls Extension will continue to be owned by 
the public sector but let to the private sector through concessions. 
Transmission - A separate transmission company would be responsible for network 
maintenance, system operation and dispatch, and bulk purchase and supply of electricity. 
Initially, responsibility for transmission will remain with the UEB and will be operated as an 
independent profit-making business. UEB's existing transmission assets will be let under a 
concession contract to a private sector entity in the medium term, while ownership of the assets 
will remain in the public sector. 
Distribution - Reform of the distribution system is key to the success of the whole program. 
Concessions would be granted to the private sector. 
A ring-fenced business unit within the Transmission Company will be responsible for bulk 
purchase and supply of electricity. It will therefore oversee PP As for the Owen Falls Power 
Station and Owen Falls Extension, and the IPPs under development and contracts to supply 
distribution companies. It will also be responsible for generation planning, contracting new 











generation capacity directly with generators and the transmission network will be operated on 
an open-access basis (Kabagamle-Kaliisa 1999). 
The implementation of the UEB privatisation formally commenced in April 2000, comprising 
the following key activities: 
• Adhering to financial, legal and environmental due diligence; 
• Drawing up an inventory and valuation of UEB assets and liabilities; 
• Formalising a distribution and transmission investment needs analysis; 
• Finalising the process of drafting licences, regulations, concession and power sale 
agreements; and 
• Financial tariff modelling (Nyirinkindi, 2003). 
During April 2001 the functional separation of the UEB started with the preparation of policies 
for unbundling into individual generation, transmission and distribution sectors/companies. 
The unbundling included the division of assets and liabilities of UEB into the successor 
companies, Uganda Electricity Generation Company Limited (UEGCL), Uganda Transmission 
Company Limited (UETCL) and Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Limited (UEDCL) .. 
After two years it was evident that the UEB separation permitted greater transparency in 
electricity pricing and in monitoring the efficiency of the three business segments. Corporate 
governance of the sector improved significantly, opening the way for new independent 
suppliers in the generation and distribution sectors (Nyirinkindi, 2003). 
During September 2001, a 'request for proposals' for a concession was distributed to seven pre-
qualified bidders, including an information memorandum, due diligence procedures, bidding 
procedures, and the concession agreements. Both generation and distribution concessions 
foresee a major investment commitment by the concessionaire under a restoration and 
reinforcement plan, which is mutually agreed between the concessionaire and ERA. This 
commitment amounts to a total of US$ 6.8 million for the generation concession within the first 
four years, and a total of US$59.4 million in the same period for the distribution concession. 
The distribution concessionaire is required to connect 15 000 new customers in the first four 
years, followed by a minimum requirement of 25 000 new connections from year 5 of the 
concession. The concessionaires are bidding at a certain rate of return on investment and an 
operation and maintenance charge. The structure of the concession was perceived as being 
positive to both the need for attracting private investors and the country's long-term 











signed a 20-year generation concessIOn with Eskom Enterprises of South Africa. The 
distribution concession is by volwne and nature more complicated and the government has only 
recently concluded negotiations with the highest ranked bidder. The Utility Reform Unit will, 
even after the transaction closure, monitor the early stages of the implementation, particularly 
during the transition period and in the first one or two years of both concessions. The Unit is 
continuously assisting the statutory companies UEGCL and UEDCL in monitoring the 
concession agreements, as well as the transmission company UETCL, which still remains under 
government control (Nyirinkindi, 2003). 
During June 2003, the Uganda Regulatory Authority (ERA) drew up a four-year business plan 
(2003-2006). Also drawn up was the ten year strategic plan (2003-2013) aiming at developing 
a well-regulated, private-sector driven energy sector capable of sustaining Uganda's ESI. 
However, the energy sector is facing challenges including the facilitation of new IPPs at 
Bujagali and Karwna and the creation of a single buyer market with Uganda Electricity 
Transmission Company Limited (UETCL) (www.allafrica.com/stories/200306090964.html). 
3.2.5 ELECTRIFICATION AND ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 
Steady progress was made in new electricity connections during the 1990s, although only 5% of the 
population had gained access by 2000. 
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Recent studies conducted by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMO) and an 
ESMAPI World Bank team have shown that self-generation is common in outlying areas. It is 
estimated that there is around 80MW of privately installed captive electricity generation capacity. 
Most of the energy is produced using diesel generation or from car batteries (Webb & Derbyshire, 
2000). It is estimated that, of the 80 MW of privately installed electricity generation capacity 
(including stand-by generation in urban areas), about 30 MW is in the rural areas. An estimated 
200 000 households are using car batteries, which are 30 times more expensive than grid power per 
unit of energy. It can therefore be argued that there is reasonable willingness to pay for electricity 
services, especially in rural areas (Bbumba, 2000). 
The 1999 Act provides for incentives for rural electrification like the delegation of some powers of 
the Regulator to Local Authorities for purposes of exercising "light regulation" in order to facilitate 
the development and functioning of small power supply systems in rural areas. The Act also 
provides for ownership of generation facilities below 10 MW, under BOOT arrangements. With 
regard to rural electrification, the Act states that government shall undertake to promote, support 
and provide rural electrification programmes through public and private sector participation in 
order to achieve equitable regional distribution access to electricity. The aims are also to maximise 
the economic, social and environmental benefits of rural electrification subsidies, promote the 
expansion of the grid and the development of off-grid electrification 
The Rural Electrification Strategy and Plan (RE) is a 10-year pUblic-private partnership, with 
Government creating an enabling environment to invest in rural electrification projects. The cost is 
estimated at $ 400 million, and will include a mix of commercial fuels. The RE strategy seeks to 
maximise the economic, social and environmental benefits of rural electrification subsidies through 
a close co-ordination of the electrification programme with other Government activities in the rural 
areas. The primary objective of the RE Strategy is to reduce the inequalities in access to electricity 
and the associated opportunities for increased social welfare, education, health and income 
generating opportunities. The objectives of the Government's RE Strategy are set out in Section 63 
of the Electricity Act, which states that: 
"The Government shall undertake to promote, support and provide rural electrification programmes 
through public and private sector participation in order to: 
(a) Achieve equitable regional distribution access to electricity; 
(b) Maximise the economic, social and environmental benefits of rural electrification subsidies; 
(c) Promote expansion of the grid and development of off-grid electrification; and 











The main objective of the RE strategy is to reduce inequalities in national access to electricity 
and the associated opportunities for increased social welfare, education and income generating 
opportunities. The target is to reach a rural electrification rate of 10%. That means 400 000 
rural households are to be serviced by the year 2010. 
Another important element of the Government's RE Strategy is the promotion of renewable 
energy. At present, apart from the large hydropower plants, only a fraction of Uganda's 
renewable energy potential is being exploited, but it can provide a cost-effective method of 
electrification, especially in the rural areas. 
Substantial amounts of electricity can potentially be generated from co-generation by sugar 
industries, gasification from coffee processing industries and biogas from biodegradable waste. In 
order for government to achieve the objective of meeting growing electricity demand, especially in 
rural areas, there will be more focus on the development of isolated supply systems. 
There is some justification for subsidies to rural electrification, which has a history of market 
failure. This market failure and justification for subsidies has two components, one is the 
absence of an appropriate institutional framework for supporting rural electrification, and the 
other is the inability to capture the value of positive development externalities in tariff setting. 
Without subsidies, there will be little community electrification. Subsidy targets to rural 
electrification projects are required in the form of direct subsidies to reduce the up-front costs 
and increase affordability, and indirect subsidies through the financing of awareness and 
capacity building for the development of the supporting business infrastructure. The Rural 
Electrification Master Plan by means of the Electricity Act of 1999 obligates the Government 
to undertake to promote, support and provide rural electrification programmes through public 
and private sector participation. The main objective of the REMP will be to provide guidelines 
and establish priorities for public and private investments in rural electrification in order to 
meet development needs in a coordinated and cost effective manner while addressing the issues 
pertaining to the imbalances in regional distribution access of electricity. The plan will aim to 
help the planners to: 
• Understand rural electricity demand; 
• Identify grid and off-grid areas suitable for electrification; 
• Prioritise potential projects; 











• Carry out grid network analysis for rural electrification; 
• Identify projects for implementation by the private sector or public\private sector 
partnership; 
• Enable the population to understand the viable options for providing them with electricity 
(www.energyandminerals.go.ug/PDFs!respO I.pdf.). 
To address issues of poverty alleviation, Government has formulated the Energy for Rural 
Transformation Program to be implemented with the assistance of the World Bank and other 
donors. The objectives of this program are: 
• Improving rural quality of life and facilitating significant rural non-farm income by 
accelerating rural electrification, including from Solar PV systems, with a tentative 
target of increasing rural electricity access from about I % to over 10% in 2010; 
• The promotion of development and use of Uganda's renewable energy resources on a 
cost-effective basis with a tentative generation target of about 70 MW from small 
renewable energy resources by 2010 and the development of a tradition of commercial 
woody biomass; 
• The provision of funding for rural electrification. The main purpose of the fund will be 
to provide "smart subsidies" by buying down the initial cost of investment for 
connection, but ensuring that the consumers pay the economic cost of supply through 
the tariff (Kabagambe-Kaliisa, 1999). 
The program was designed to be mainly private sector-driven and commercially oriented. The 
major elements of the program are: 
• Grid intensification, to the load centres within the proximity of the grid network; 
• Development of isolated generation systems and associated mini-grids for those load 
centres that cannot be economically connected to the grid network; 
• Development of small renewable power supply systems that could be operated as stand-
alone connected to the grid (Kabagambe-Kaliisa, 1999). 
A Rural Electrification Agency (REA) and a Rural Electrification Fund (REF) were established in 
2003. The REA has the responsibility to identify and promote rural electrification projects, whereas 
the REF provides capital subsidies and support for debt finance. The intention of the subsidy is to 
"buy-down" the capital cost of investment to the extent that, at reasonable tariffs, the project is 











Government electrification targets are shown in Table 3 below. It is evident that the 
government is committed to a steady increase in electrification rates until the end of the decade. 
Rural electrification shows a slower increase in connection rates, as the argument of 
affordability and economies of scale is operative. In comparison to other countries these 
figures may appear very conservative, but given the fact that rural electrification was 2.5% in 
2000, and is aiming for a rate 0[8.9% by the end of the decade is commendable. 
Table 1- Electrification Targets 
CATEGORY YEAR 
2000 2005 2010 
Rural households 3,8 million 4.1 million 4,5 million 
Electrified rural households 100000 155000 400000 
Urban electrified households 170000 220000 295000 
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION RATE 2.50% 3.80% 8.90% 
Urban households 0.8 mil 1.1 mil 1.3 mil 
URBAN ELECTRIFICATION RATE 21% 20% 23% 
Total number of Households 4.6m 5.2m 5.8m 
Total number of electrified households 270000 375000 695000 
TOTAL ELECTRIFICATION 5.90% 7.20% 12.00% 
RATE 
Source: (Karekezi & Kimani, 2002) 
3.2.6 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, positive economic reforms in Uganda led to the government seeing the necessity 
to extend and improve its infrastructure. Previously, the power sector was publicly-owned and 
vertically integrated. The very low electricity connection rates, as well as the high technical 
losses and illegal use added impetus to the reform process. Currently the sector is in a state of 
transition, and there are indications that a considerable number of people can afford grid supply 











Uganda is one of the few African countries to unbundled its power sector. It has introduced 
private participation into generation and distribution - and has also set up a Rural 
Electrification Agency and Rural Electrification Fund. 
The Rural Electrification strategy alms to achieve 450 000 connections by 2010, usmg a 
combination of grid, mini-grids and off-grid systems. Power sector refonn has thus been 












3.3 SOUTH AFRICA 
3.3.1 OVERVIEW 
The history of the South African electricity supply industry is linked to the development of the 
mining and railway industries. Eskom (originally the Electricity Supply Commission) was 
established in terms of the electricity act in 1922, and was controlled by a commission 
appointed by the State President. Before 1948, electricity supply was a mixture of privately-
owned utilities and municipalities. After 1948 Eskom took over the Victoria Falls and 
Transvaal Power Company, and the generation and transmission of electricity essentially 
became a monopoly (Horwitz, 1994, p.2). 
Until the 1970's, Eskom benefited from improving technical efficiencies, an active expansion 
of the national grid, increasing demand as well as economies of scale. During the first half of 
the 1980's performance was affected by a range of problems such as high inflation rates, 
increased finance charges, and a reduction in the pace and effect of technical improvements. 
Simultaneously, forecasters over-estimated capacity requirements and Eskom contracted 
unnecessary generation facilities. These factors led to erratic tariff increases in the mid-1970's 
and again in the early 1980's. Government appointed the De Villiers Commission to 
investigate the electricity sector. The commission criticised demand forecasts among other 
factors, and this situation led to new legislation in 1987. Until the early 1990's, Eskom was 
primarily a generation and transmission utility with distribution mostly managed by local 
authorities and municipalities (Davis 1999, pA-6). 
During the mid-1980's Eskom saw significant restructuring. New Eskom and Electricity Acts 
were passed in 1987. Eskom's governance was overhauled, and it was required to act on a 
commercial basis. The rationale for this commercialisation without privatisation lay in the 
belief that efficiencies associated with a greater degree of market orientation can be obtained 
without changing public ownership. Eskom instituted a two-tier governance structure, namely 
a board of control (Electricity Council), and a management board. The Electricity Council was 
to operate in the same way as a company's board of directors and included stakeholder 
representation from industry, commerce, municipalities and government. The 'zero-profit' 
principle was replaced with a mandate to provide electricity in the most cost-effective manner. 
The Eskom Council was awarded a high degree of independence in setting tariffs and policies. 











The situation facing the Electricity Supply Industry was, and still is, full of challenges. The 
highly fragmented distribution sector, with more than 400 distributors at one stage, resulted in 
low efficiencies, high costs, wide tariff disparities, and financial viability problems for 
distributors. The distribution sector also faced high levels of non-payment and electricity theft, 
resulting in mounting debt. 
Coal-based electricity generation results in significant pollution, with long-term effects on the 
environment. It is expected that electricity demand will exceed supply by 2007, and strategies 
are needed to make room for the demands of a growing economy. Despite the above-
mentioned challenges, South Africa has to maintain the advantage of low, stable and cost-
reflective electricity prices (www.dme.org.za/whitepaper). 
Approximately 96% of the electricity generated in South Africa is produced by Eskom. The 
remaining 4% is generated by 8 municipalities. In addition, a small number of privately-owned 
co-generators generate about 1200 MW of electricity for own use. 
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According to Eberhard (2003), most analysts identify four broad international drivers for power 
sector reform: 
(1) Improvement of investment and operational efficiencies; 
(2) Technological innovation; 
(3) New capacity expansion, which can make difficult demands on public expenditure; 
(4) The potential to unlock economic value and reduce government debt. 
Eberhard (2003, p.4) also mentions that "it is probably true to say that none of these drivers are 
experienced strongly in South Africa". This is partly because new generation technologies 
such as Combined-Cycle Gas Turbines have limited application in South Africa, and also 
because Eskom can raise private capital through bond issues. Public finances are well managed 
and there is no desperate need for privatisation cash-inputs. However, key to reform efforts 
will be to avoid the poor investment performance of the past, as well as the need to improve the 
poor performance of many of the smaller local distributors. Key to the reform efforts is the 
need to sustain the delivery and expansion of affordable electricity services to all South 
Africans (Eberhard, 2003) 
3.3.2 ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY REFORM 
The basis for ESI reform was laid in 1998 in the White Paper on Energy Policy, encompassing 
the principles of improved social equity by addressing the energy requirements of the poor, 
enhancing the efficiency and competitiveness of the economy by providing high quality and 
low cost electricity inputs, and achieving environmental sustainability. In addition, the goal 
was to give customers the right the choose their electricity supplier, permit open and non-
discriminatory access to the transmission system, and encourage private sector participation in 
the industry (Energy White Paper, 1998). 
In August 2000, the Ministry of Public Enterprises published "A Policy Framework: An 
Accelerated Agenda towards the Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises", which envisaged 
the unbundling of Eskom and the introduction of competition. 
Government passed the Eskom Conversion Act in 2001 which clarified Eskom's shareholding 
and made it liable for the payment of taxes and dividends. With this came the termination of its 











In May 2001, Cabinet approved proposals for the reform of the ESI through a "managed 
liberalisation" process: 
• Structure Eskom retains 70% of the existing generation market, with the remainder to 
be privatised, with an initial aim of 10% transferring to black economic ownership no 
later than 2004; 
• Unbundling - ensuring open access to the transmission lines, a separate state owned 
Transmission Company will be established, with ring~fenced transmission system 
operation and market operation functions; 
• Market structure - to become a multi-market electricity market which ensures that 
transactions between generators, traders and purchasers may take place on a variety of 
platforms, including a power exchange; 
• Regulation - the regulatory framework will ensure the participation of IPP's and the 
diversification of primary energy sources (Eberhard, 2003). 
Government engaged consultants to design the new electricity market. However, government 
has since pulled back from its policy of introducing competition. Eskom's status of supplier of 
last resort has been confirmed and it has been given a mandate to invest in new generation 
capacity. The private sector will be invited to participate on the margin - i.e. government will 
run tenders for independent power producers (IPPs) to supplement Eskom investments. 
3.3.3 ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION REFORM 
The need and rationale for merging Eskom distributors with the large number of local 
government distributors has been debated since 1992. There has been broad agreement that 
rationalisation of the industry will enable economies of scale and scope. In May 2001, Cabinet 
agreed that local government and Eskom distributors should be rationalised into six Regional 
Electricity Distributors (RED's) and that an EDI Holdings Company would be established to 
manage the transition. 
Municipalities in each RED area will have to transfer their electricity distribution business and 
assets to that RED. They will then enter into a service delivery agreement with the RED to 
govern distribution of electricity in their municipal area. Each municipality will partly own 
their RED but the extent of their ownership will depend on the value of the assets they 
transferred to it. Many municipalities generate significant surpluses from electricity sales, 
surpluses that are often a large percentage of a municipalities' income, and the loss of that 










therefore guarantees the continued payment of surpluses to the municipalities by way of a 
'municipal levy'. There are options to include a direct levy by municipalities, a levy imposed 
by the RED itself on behalf ofthe municipality, or payment by some other means. Government 
(through DME) wholly owns the EDI Holdings company - with board representation for South 
African Local Government Association (SALGA), Eskom and national government. Key 
stakeholders, including SALGA and national government have also recently signed a co-
operation agreement paving the way for the restructuring process. The plan is to encourage 
individual municipalities to also sign the agreements. The co-operative agreement requires 
municipalities to 'ring-fence' their electricity distribution businesses in preparation for transfer 
to the RED's. This means each municipality must create financially separate business units for 
their electricity distribution function. The timeline for restructuring envisaged that 
municipalities would start the ring-fencing process from June 2002. It was expected that the 
establishment of the RED's would begin in October 2003 and end by October 2005, but as yet, 
it has not materialised. The RED's will be monitored and evaluated until the process is 
finished, and then EDI Holdings is intended to be phased out (Electricity Distribution Industry 
Restructuring Bill of2002). 
3.3.4 REGULATION 
The Electricity Act was amended in 1994 and 1995 to establish the National Electricity 
Regulator (NER). This regulatory authority may issue licences for: 
• The construction of generation, transmission and distribution of electricity; 
• The operation of the above mentioned facilities; 
• The import and export of electricity; 
• The retail of electricity, and; 
• Any prescribed service related to the generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity. 
The NER may gather and store information regarding the construction, operation and the 
provision of services in the generation, transmission, distribution and retailing of electricity. It 
can impose penalties and issue directives to licensees, act as mediator between parties, consult 
with Government Departments and other bodies and institutions regarding the ESI. The 
authority will also co-operate with other persons for capacity building, and advise the Minister 
and Government regarding matters affecting the ESI industry. It is also to approve prices, 











in a transparent manner, and promote competition in the ESI. The NER must promote an 
efficient, reliable and economic system of electricity supply, and regulate the industry such that 
it sustains improvements in efficiency and reliability of electricity supply. The NER also has a 
role to play in the attainment of social goals such as electrification, and in a broader sense, 
access to electricity services. The Regulatory Authority consists of nine members appointed by 
the Minister. who also designates one of the members as chairperson. 
3.3.5 ELECTRIFICATION AND ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 
In 1992, Eskom started a concerted effort to electrify as many households in South Africa as 
possible. This early initiative culminated in the establishment of the National Electrification 
Forum in 1993. This forum presented a set of recommendations to cabinet in the second half of 
1994, and it developed financial models of various scenarios for the national electrification 
programme. The information was used by the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) to establish a national electrification target of 2, 5 million households by 1999 (No 
author - w\vw.dme.org.za/whitepaper). 
Before 1994, only 12% of South Africa's rural population had access to electricity. By the end 
of 1999, this figure has improved to 43%. The overall electrification figure of South Africa 
was 36% before 1994, a figure which jumped to 70% by the end of 1999. Other obstacles to 
this problem are the existence of the culture of non-payment stemming from the apartheid era, 
and low affordability levels due to unemployment (www.bt.co.za). The current Energy White 
Paper (1998) made provision for a National Electrification Fund to subsidise electrification 
projects. The Minister of Minerals and Energy appointed the National Electrification Co-
ordinating Committee (NECC) in April 1999. The goal of this body is was to advise on the 
way forward for the National Electrification Programme. Government subsequently established 
a National Electrification Fund and a national electrification planning process. Annual 
allocations are made to Eskom and Local Authorities to meet electrification targets. 









Figure 6-Electrification Figures 
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Until 2000, the electrification programme was largely funded by Eskom or through transfers to 
an electrification fund that the NER allocated to municipalities. Between 1994 and 1999 more 
than R8 billiqn was spent on the electrification programme, with the average cost per 
cOimection at around R3 200. The electricity industry has been able to fund and cross-subsidise 
this programme largely due to the large industrial customer base. At the beginning of the 
programme it was estimated tliat the average monthly consumption of newly cOimected low-
income households would be 350 kWh, but in practice an average consumption of around 130 
kWh was maintained, sometimes as low as 50 kWh. Nearly all of the new connections have 
used pre-payment technology, but many connections involve informal housing using pre-wired 
'ready-boards'. Eskom has also sought to contain the costs of rural connections through 
providing load-limited supplies. In addition to the grid-based electrification programme, there 
has been an active off-grid programme using PV technology. Between 1994 and 2000, 1350 
schools were electrified in this way. Government has awarded subsidy concessions to private 
industry service providers in five geographic areas to supply solar home systems (Eberhard 
2003). 
The Division of Revenue Bill 200312004 on Local Authorities made provision for a separate 
window for the funding of free basic services, including electricity, which took effect 1 July 











households are eligible to receive a total of 50 kWh free electricity, which will allow for the use 
of basic services such as lights, radio and a two-plate stove for a month. The proposed level of 
basic electricity is motivated on the basis that 56% of households in South Africa connected to 
the national grid consume on average less than 50 kWh of electricity per month. The level of 
services provided by this amount of electricity can be further increased by introducing energy 
efficiency lighting. The first year's funding from National Government, as facilitated by the 
Division of Revenue Bill, amounts to R483 million, with an additional RIOO million being set 
aside to improve billing systems of municipalities. This subsidy applies to rural and urban 
households, and in non-grid areas, which receive mostly solar energy services, consumers 
receives a subsidy of up to 80% of the cost of the solar electricity systems. (Business Day 6 
December 2002). 
3.3.6 CONCLUSION 
South Africa's power sector has undergone only modest reform. Eskom was forced to operate 
on a more commercial basis. It has been corporatised, pays taxes and dividends, and has 
accountable to its shareholder (government) in terms of its financial performance. One of the 
consequences of the corporatisation of Eskom was the termination of its internal funding of the 
electrification programme. Government anticipated this shift by establishing a National 
Electrification Fund resourced by allocations from National Treasury. The Department of 
Minerals and Energy manages the national electrification programme and annual allocations to 
Eskom and local authorities to meet electrification targets. Hence power sector reform has not 
impacted negatively on access to electricity. Instead, special measures were put in place to 
secure ongoing electrification. 
While the number of new electricity connections has increased dramatically over the past 
decade, the affordability of electricity remains a problem. It will be crucial for government to 
sustain the current electricity subsidies to poor communities if their welfare is to be supported 
into the future. The slow progress in reforming the distribution sector is prejudicing the 
implementation of affordable and sustainable electricity services for poor consumers. 
However, the mammoth task of increasing the household electrification rate from 32% to over 
70% in a decade can serve as an excellent example to the world about what can be 
accomplished with political will and efficient resource allocation. Unfortunately, the reform 











The key question will be whether the power sector reform efforts and increased access to 
electricity by especially poverty-stricken households will be sustainable. It would seem that for 
the foreseeable future, South Africa will have to continue with its current subsidy scheme, not 
only to make the service affordable, but also to boost consumption. A substantial number of 
households will remain too remote to provide them with grid-extended electricity, and they will 
have to be provided for by means of off-grid systems. Finally, the reform process in South 
Africa seems to have been successful in creating a sound regulatory framework and special 











CHAPTER FOUR - SOUTH EAST ASIA 
4.1 INDONESIA 
4.1.1 OVERVIEW 
Indonesia is composed of 17 000 islands, of which some 3000 are inhabited. The Indonesian 
electricity sector was founded at the end of the 19th century. A nationalised electric power 
company called Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN) was established in 1960 for the purpose of 
providing electricity all over Indonesia. Before the creation of PLN, electricity in Indonesia 
was provided by several private agencies under the Dutch colonial government. In 1972 the 
government confirmed the status of PLN as Perusahaan Umum (a state-owned public utility 
company) (Seymour & Sari, 2001). 
PLN's mission was: "to supply electric power on the basis of fair business principles and ensure 
its existence and development in the long term ... as an agent of development, to support the 
improvement of the welfare and prosperity of the society to stimulate economic growth" (No 
author-webserver.rad.net.id/plnl). 
PLN operates over 600 separate unconnected transmission and distribution systems. The 
largest, lava-Bali is served by two generating subsidiaries and four distribution units. Around 
60% of the population resides on Java. Some rural and island communities meet their own 
power requirements and are not connected to the PLN grid, but the national electrification plan 
calls for a 100% electrification rate of villages by 2003-2004 (Seymour & Sari, 2001). 
Indonesia was hailed as an example of development success by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, until the 1997 Thai currency crisis adversely affected many 
south-east Asian countries. High economic growih during the first part of the 1990's 
encouraged a large inflow of foreign capital, leading to medium- and long-term electricity 
expansion and indigenous energy resource development plans being drawn up in anticipation of 
continued growth. During this period, the country saw substantial growth in electricity demand. 
However, after 1997, serious economic instability and heavy external debt gave rise to 
Indonesia's economy being described by the IMF and World Bank as inefficient, plagued with 
poor governance and corruption. Yet the IMF and the World Bank continued to make huge 
loans to the government. The economic crisis resulted in reduced industrial electricity 











sector generates around 30% of total government revenue and serves as an important source of 
foreign exchange (no author - www.usaid.gov/country/ane/id/497-013.html). 
As the crisis erupted in mid-1997, many energy projects were either ongoing, or scheduled to 
begin during the following two to three years. Some projects were due for implementation 
from 2000 through to 2010. The economic health ofPLN during the latter part of the 1990's 
was not only negatively affected by the afore-mentioned economic crisis, but it was also 
plagued by financial ill-health. These losses occurred despite increases in revenue and 
subsidies from Government. The reasons were firstly due to expensive power purchase 
agreements with Independent Power Producers (IPP's) in foreign exchange, while sales were in 
Rupiah. Secondly, the country had to service large external loans for infrastructural investment 
- loans amounting to US$ 876 million, or 10% of the Government's total foreign loans. The 
Rupiah's devaluation only increased the external debt. A case in point here is the 183% 
increase in debt service during the 1998-99 financial year, compared to the previous year. 
Thirdly, corruption and high levels of inefficiency at PLN further exacerbated the problem. 
Lastly, Indonesia experienced considerably lower electricity demand than previously expected 
in 1998, which caused an annual loss of US$ 39 million (Motoyama & Widago, 1999 & 
No author - www.nepo.go.thlinter/aseaniAMEMI7-BangkokiAMEM-CR-Indonesia.html). 
According to Motoyama & Widago (1999), due to the monetary crisis many IPP projects were 
suspended, and by the end of 1999, less than 10 plants were producing power. The purchase price 
paid to the IPP's by PLN is much higher in comparison to neighbouring countries. This situation 
can be ascribed to high IPP construction, operation and maintenance costs. Despite a Presidential 
decree requiring a regulatory framework for private sector participation, it is widely known that 
competitive bidding was rarely implemented in developing most IPP plants. After the economic 
crisis broke, many American vendors were reluctant to accommodate PLN efforts to renegotiate 
firm PP A contracts. In an attempt to recover its financial status, PLN started renegotiating with 
several IPP's in order to reduce the purchasing price of electricity and re-negotiate the conversion 
rate of the dollar to Rupiah used in the PPA's (Motoyama & Widago 1999). 
Three options offered by PLN to some IPP's with plants already in operation or entering the 
advanced stage of completion were: 
• Adjusting fixed charges, to be based on the project replacement cost; 
• A buy-out of the project at a certain discount rate, attaching the assets to a portfolio 











• Continuing with the present PPA's until 2003, where-after the IPPs would operate as 
merchant power plant (Motoyama & Widago, 1999). 
4.1.3 RESTRUCTURING OF THE POWER SECTOR 
Initial restructuring efforts started in 1985 by means of Act No 15, which was the pnmary 
piece of legislation in electricity, which included provisions covering: optimising the use of 
resources, respect for the environment, etc. The goal was also to increase the welfare and 
prosperity of the people, stimulating an increase in economic activities by placing the 
responsibility of general power sector planning on government. Electricity tariffs were to be 
regulated by the government. (No author 
- www.infid.belbackgroundpaperprivatisasienglish1.html) & (Seymour & Sari, 200 I). 
During 1989, government issued Regulation No. 10, clarifying the relationship between the 
annual electricity plan and PLN's business plan, requiring the holder of a public interest licence 
to be an Indonesian corporation; requiring holders of own-use licences to sell surplus electricity 
to PLN; and confirming the President's rights over sale prices. Presidential Decree 37 of 1992 
reflected the government's attitude towards the availability of public finance for the electricity 
sector, opening the way for private investment in power plants, with an expressed preference 
for build-own-operate schemes. It stated that the power prices are to be in Rupiah and must be 
approved by the minister. Section 5 prohibited government guarantees for invested capital or 
loans (No author - w\\'w.infid.be/backgroundpaperprivatisasienglish1.html & Seymour & Sari, 
2001). 
Service provision by private companies was already allowed in a limited way by means of Act 
No. 15 of 1985 on Electrical Energy. The role of foreign companies was further encouraged by 
Government Regulation 20 of 1994 on Share Ownership in companies established under the 
foreign investment scheme. By adopting these regulations in order to facilitate privatisation, 
several state-owned enterprises have been taken over by foreign companies. These privatisation 
actions were a cause of conflict between government and labour unions on the one hand, and 
foreign investors on the other. Government responded to the economic crisis of 1997 with 
Presidential Decree No. 39/1997, followed by Decree NO.5 of 1998 regarding the 27 IPP 
projects. These decrees categorised the status of all of the IPP projects into three groupings, 
namely "continue", "review" and "postpone" 











The above-mentioned decree did not intend to terminate signed contracts, but pursued proposed 
international arbitration in the case of three geothermal plant projects. The renegotiation of 
contracts with IPP's implied enormous compensation, as well as court arbitration, and it was 
not clear if sufficient funds could be raised to cover these payments. One potential alternative 
was to give power companies equity in the state utility. However, this would not guarantee a 
fair, transparent privatisation process in spite of a need for transparency in PP A renegotiations. 
It must be kept in mind that successor companies of PLN would have to honour IPP contracts. 
A fair amount of corruption and nepotism have been revealed in these privatisations, leading to 
the issuing in 1998 of the Presidential Decree No 7211998 on the Evaluation Team for 
Privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises. This Decree replaced the earlier Presidential Decree 
No. 55 of 1996 on this issue. 
August 1998 also saw the official launch of the Power Sector Restructuring Policy. In an 
attempt to resolve problems faced by the power sector, Presidential Decree No. 13911998 was 
issued in September 1998, and a PLN Restructuring and Rehabilitation Team consisting of 
seven ministers related to the energy industry was appointed. The main tasks of this body were 
to define and review PLN strategic policy, the implementation of measures regarding the legal 
relationships between PLN and third parties, and to define steps to ensure PLN's viability in 
organisational and financial aspects. A working group of senior government and PLN officials 
had to define the framework of principles within which PLN could conduct the renegotiation of 
IPP contracts. In addition, this framework had to ensure that fair, well-structured and 
transparent procedures were followed. However, all negotiations with the IPP's were 
conducted by PLN on a commercial basis, without direct government involvement (No author-
\vww. infid.be/backgroundpaperprivatisasienglish l.html & Seymour & Sari, 2001). 
A number of proposals have been forward to introduce full competition in the Indonesian power 
sector. For example, the World Bank proposed that PLN should be replaced by several 
Strategic Business Units (SBU's) with responsibility for power generation, transmission and 
distribution. The generation units and distribution would eventually be privatised. For the 
Java-Bali region, a competitive market was proposed as there are already a number of 
generators and a considerable market to accommodate a commercially-run sector. The power 
generation, transmission and distribution activities outside Java-Bali was not considered mature 
enough for such competition (Widago + Motoyama, 1999, p.13). A separate, independent 











The Asian Development Bank suggested that the two existing PLN generation subsidiaries, 
Pembangkita Tanaga Listrik I and II will be split into 5 or more generation companies. The 
regional generation companies would compete with IPP's in bidding into the power pool for the 
best prices based on short-run marginal costs of generation (Widago & Yokohama, 1999, p.l4). 
The three government agencies directly involved in the implementation of the restructuring 
agenda were the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the Ministry for Empowerment of State 
Enterprises, and the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Mines and Energy's functions were: 
• Overseeing the development of the new Draft Electricity Law of 2002 with technical 
assistance from the ADB; 
• Developing new tariff codes and tariff increases and new codes and Governmental 
Regulations; 
• Initiating and establishing a regulatory agency and undertaking capacity building 
through technical assistance for regulatory implementation; 
• Renegotiation of IPPs and other contracts involving rationalisation and integration of 
the IPPs into the new industrial structure. 
The Ministry for Empowerment of State Enterprises was In charge of restructuring, 
corporatisation and privatisation of PLN and ensuring and enhancing its financial viability. The 
Ministry of Finance was in charge of subsidies and issues related to government finance. The 
Ministry of Mines and Energy later became the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 
while the Ministry for Empowerment of State Enterprises was later dissolved to become part of 
the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
Despite all these restructuring plans actual reform progress has been very slow. By 2002 nothing 
much had changed. A new Electricity Law (No 20/2002) was passed that provided a 
comprehensive legal framework for the development of the electricity sector. Competition for 
power generation on the islands of Batam, Java and Bali is due by 2007 and private companies will 
be allowed to enter the distribution sector. 
In 2003, the government renegotiated 26 IPP projects. OF these, five were taken over by the 
government in cooperation with PLN. 
Indonesia is facing a looming electricity capacity crisis. It is estimated that severe shortages 











planning to build the Maura Tawar power plant in Bekasi, West Java as part of the state's 
efforts to meet growing electricity demand, especially in Java and Bali. Currently consumption 
is growing at 8% per year and new generation investment has been practically non-existent 
since the 1997 monetary crisis. (http://articles.ibonweb.com/magarticle.asp?num=1211). 
PLN remains in a dominant position -despite years of restructuring plans. IPPs have been 
introduced - but there is no effective competition. It remains to be seen whether the latest 
restructuring plans will come to fruition. 
4.1.4 ELECTRICITY PRICES AND ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 
Low-income households are subsidised by Government. There were previous attempts to 
increase tariffs in order to make up for the negative effects of inflation and financial losses by 
PLN. After 1994 tariffs for all customer categories were increased by between 29-40%. 
However, Government had to terminate planned tariff increases in 1998 in the face of strong 
opposition. The increase would have doubled the tariffs for the lowest income residential 
customers. According to the PLN-IPP contracts, PLN had to purchase electricity (USD) at 5-8 
cents/kWh, while it sold electricity at 2-3 cents/kWh as a result of Government subsidies. 
The move to bring tariffs to commercially viable levels is an ongoing process as Government 
and PLN are trying to persuade the public of the benefits of a competitive market. Their 
message to the public is that it will result in lower average consumer tariffs in the long term, 
although they also warned of an increase in tariffs in the transition period. The average tariff 
increases proposed were 18% by October 1999, a further 20% by the end of February 2000, and 
whatever additional increases necessary to achieve an 8% rate of return by 2001. The timing of 
the increases was based on a study funded by the ADB. An automatic monthly tariff adjustment 
mechanism was to be introduced from 31 March 2000. The purpose of these adjustments is to 
reflect the movements in the prices of fuel, exchange rate, inflation, and other elements 
affecting the electricity price. Poor household tariff increases were to be buffered by means of 
poverty tariffs and lifeline subsidies. 
It was recognised "upon the completion of the competitive market, continued government 
subsidies will still be required for consumers in less developed and rural areas as well as by the 
urban poor because companies will have difficulty in providing electricity at affordable prices 
for these people" (Motoyama & Widago, 1999, p.14). Subsidies were to be paid out of general 
taxes, rather than relying on cross-subsidisation. The subsidies were to be financed by the 











residential consumers in the outer islands, as well as subsidising the distribution and retail 
sectors within lava-Bali for poor consumers unable to afford electricity (Motoyama & Widago, 
1999, p.l4) 
In November 2001, the new electricity rate proposal for 2002 was announced. This increase 
was applied to all households. The Directorate General for Electricity and Energy Utilisation 
stated that the increases were still below PLN production cost. Since 1999, low-income 
households with an installed power capacity of between 250 and 450 VA had been exempted 
from electricity rate increases. The new pricing scheme was based on the agreement between 
the House of Representatives and Government in October 2001, to increase electricity by an 
average 6% every three months in 2002. According to this new scheme households with an 
installed capacity of 250 VA would increase by 16% in the first quarter, 15% in the second 
quarter, 15% in the third quarter and 12% in the fourth quarter. For 450 VA the rate increase 
would be 15%, 16%, 18% and 19% for the four quarters respectively. The middle income 
households with a 2000 V A capacity, the rate increase would be 8%, 9%, 8% and 7% for each 
quarter. An average increase of 8% is to be charged to high income households. For small 
industrial customers, the rate increase would be 7% for every quarter and about 4% every three 
months for large industrial customers. Thus poor households have experienced substantial 
tariff increases. 
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The figure above illustrates the dilemma Indonesia faces as its currency undergoes dramatic 
devaluation against the dollar, causing a steep increase in the purchase price of electricity in 
Rupiah. In order for PLN to attain its financial goals, Government is required to implement 
tariff increases. According to the ADB's Poverty Impact Assessment, the lowest 20% of 
households are considered poor, and only consume enough electricity to operate a light bulb for 
12 hours per day. They advocated that measures would have to be taken by Government to 
limit tariff increases for the poorest households by means of a lifeline tariff. 
Most (91 %) urban dwellers have access to electricity. However, nearly 70% of Indonesia's 180 
million population lives in rural areas spread across the country's l3 600 islands. Rural household 
electrification coverage is approximately 40% - considerably less than its neighbours Thailand with 
80% and Malaysia at 98%. In the past Government has taken a least-cost grid extension approach 
to rural electrification, with PLN as the implementing agency. Indonesia has also considered the 
provision of renewable energy as a means of providing energy services to areas not served by a 
grid. Financial incentives are provided for this scheme through a commercial framework involving 
participating banks and private sector solar home system dealers or suppliers who offer instalment-
payment to customers with 'reasonable proximity to urban centres'. The grants represent 
approximately 20% of the total system costs. Government has an underlying goal of installing one 











PLN's resources are already stretched with the implementation of conventional rural electrification 
approaches. Government also realises that financial burdens associated with rural electrification 
can be alleviated by allowing the private sector to deliver solar systems to unelectrified areas. 
However, there are some barriers to large scale delivery of solar home systems: 
• High initial input technology costs; 
• Delivery infrastructure consisting of supplier-dealer chains, and service arrangements, 
as well as a market which is not sufficient in volume to achieve economy of scale; 
• Lack of credit to end-users 
(No authornww.worldbank.org/html/fpd/energy/e3 _files/e3 _2 _files/e3 _244.html). 
In order to remove the above-mentioned barriers and fulfil rural electricity demands with solar 
home systems, the Government has requested assistance from the World Bank and Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), and with assistance from the latter, 200 000 solar home systems 
will be installed via the provision of: 
• A financing plan to private dealers through participating banks, which will enable the 
purchase of the systems by rural households and commercial establishments on an 
instalment basis plan; 
• A GEF-grant which is to be distributed to dealers and suppliers on an installed-unit 
basis (www.worldbank.org/htmllfpd/energy/e3_files/e3_2 _files/e3 _244.html). 
Approximately 100 000 solar home systems have been installed since 1990, with a total 
installed capacity of about 5MW. More than 6000 villages outside Java-Bali are considered 
as the most important target for decentralised PV systems. Unfortunately, after the 1998/99 
crisis and the devaluation of the Rupiah, the purchasing power of many rural households has 
diminished, reducing previous market projections. According to a World Bank cost 
comparison, if the household density is less than 30 households (120-150 persons) per square 
kilometre, Solar Home Systems (SHSs) are less expensive than grid electricity. If the number 
of households in a cluster is less than 50, even a kilometre grid extension is more expensive 
than Solar Home Systems. 
(www.ace.or.id/pressealindonesialsolar/current_andylanned_utilisation.htm) 
The Figures below describes vividly the stark contrast in electricity provision to communities in 
the Java and the outer islands. The problem reverts back to the cost-benefit argument of 











two regions as a whole are characterised by skewed attention from government, whether it is by 
means of household electrification, or regional electrification. 
Figure 8- Rural household access to electricity 
Source: Sahud, M & Tumiwa, F. 1999 
Figure 9- Rural Electrification Rate- households per year 
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In conclusion, it seems that many systemic problems plague Indonesia's efforts to 
simultaneously reform its power sector, increase generation capacity and keep its tariffs 
affordable. There was a definitive attempt to move away from a monopoly situation, which 
resulted in IPP investments with very high PPA's. On the other hand, with the regulatory 











tariff setting, amongst other aspects. Entities such as the World Bank and the IMF were 
extremely critical about the operation of the power sector during the height of the financial 
crisis, but continued to extend loans to the government to keep the power sector afloat. It is 
therefore to be expected that they were very prescriptive about planning of the restructuring 
efforts. Despite all these efforts, PLN remains in a dominant position and competition is still 
absent. 
There is a positive element in the fact that there have been attempts to set tariffs at levels 
according to household income, and that low-income households are subsidised by 
Government. However, the increasing tariffs from 1994 onwards for all categories was bound 
to affect the poor the most, as they were the least able to pay for electricity. 
While the great majority of urban households have access to electricity, more than half of rural 
households do not have a grid connection. The Indonesian government has demonstrated some 
commitment to rural and remote electrification efforts by promoting Solar PV programmes. 
One can not help but get the impression that it is the poor that had to bear the burden of a 
clumsy attempt by PLN to reform the sector. Indonesia serves as a good example as to what 
can go wrong if a national utility runs out of capacity, and arbitrarily decides that IPP's should 
carry the burden of making up for the shortage in capacity. It has been mentioned before, but 
the fact that electricity was purchased at US$5-8 cents/kWh, while it sold electricity at 2-3 
cents/kWh as a result of Government subsidies, highlights the fact that there were no 
comprehensive legal and regulatory checks and balances built into the system. It was the poor 
that became caught in this intricate tug-of-war between IPP's and PLN, and the very expensive 
process of re-negotiating PPA's. Government is now setting up an Electricity Market 
Regulatory Board that will regulate and supervise the business of power distribution, secure 














There has been pressure to reform the energy sector of Thailand since the 1980s from several 
politicians and businessmen. During the fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1982-1986), privatisation efforts focused on the oil and gas sectors. The sixth National and 
Economic Social Development Plan (1987-1991) laid out guidelines for private sector 
participation in infrastructure development, and these guidelines were listed in the White Paper 
on Enterprises by the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESBD) in 1988. 
March 1992 saw the Royal Act on Private Sector Participation in State Affairs, forming the 
basis for the ongoing reforms. 
The electricity supply industry of Thailand is dominated by the state-owned Electricity 
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGA T) that is responsible for generation and transmission. 
Distribution and retail fall under the Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA), and the 
Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA). The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) is 
supplied by the MEA, as well as the two adjoining provinces ofNonthaburi and Samutprakarn. 
PEA is responsible for the provision to the rest of the country. 
Thailand has been confronted with rapid economic expansion during the past two decades and 
as a result electricity consumption increased from 16.8 GWh in 1982 to 81,9 GWh in 1997. 
However, the 1997 financial crisis resulted in a decline in power demand in 1998. 
Thailand's energy affairs are scattered among many government agencies empowered with 
various energy laws. Currently, there are six energy-related state enterprises: EGAT; MEA; 
PEA; Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT); PTT Exploration and Production Co. Ltd 
(PTTEP); and the Bangchak Petroleum Public Co. Ltd (BANGCHAK). The government, 
through EGA T holds a 25% share in the Electricity Generating Public Co. Ltd (EGCO). PTT 
holds a 30.6% share in Thai LNG Power Co. Ltd (TLPC) (National Energy Policy Office, 
1999). 
The above-mentioned enterprises fall under the authority of the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of the Interior, and each is established and governed by a separate Act. In order to 
manage Thailand's energy affairs effectively, the National Energy Policy Council (NEPC), 











under the National Energy Policy Council Act of 1992. The NEPC is the major government 
agency with the responsibility of the supervision of all governmental agencies and state 
enterprises involved in energy matters. It is also responsible for developing policy guidelines 
and detailed regulations for the emerging private electric power sector, as well as the evaluation 
and approval of the long-term power development plan. The NEPC also approves the tariff 
structures (http://W\lI,'W.nortonrose.com/publications/apecThailand.html). 
4.2.2.1 REGULATION 
There are four main objectives of regulation for electricity in Thailand: 
• To ensure the provision of an adequate amount of electricity to satisfy the increasing 
demand while ensuring high quality of service, reliable supply and reasonable prices; 
• To promote efficient and economical use of electricity; 
• To promote competition in the ESI and increase private sector participation; 
• To prevent and alleviate environmental problems resulting from energy development 
(No author-
http://www.apecenergy.org.aulwelcome/background/regulators/Thailand Elec _ 00. pdf). 
To a degree, EGAT, MEA and PEA are self regulated as government enterprises, but as the 
three utilities are state enterprises, government, through the Prime Minister's Office, indirectly 
controls its management. Government directly controls prices and investment policies. EGA T 
issues the Grid Code for the Independent Power Producer programme, as well as the Small 
Power Producer programme 
(No author - http://www.nortonrose.com/publications/apecThailand.html). 
4.2.3 STRUCTURAL REFORM, COMPETITION AND PRIVATE PARTICIPATION 
The main objectives of the promotion of the private sector in the industry were to increase 
competition in order to improve efficiency within the industry; secondly, to promote adequate 
energy supply and reasonable prices for consumers; thirdly, to reduce the investment burden of 
the government, as well as public sector debt in general; and lastly to promote the more 












According to the World Bank, the main rationale for privatisation was to avoid future debt and 
risk generated by government guarantees for EGA T's debt. By the early 1990's, EGA T's debt 
had grown to more than US$4 billion. This debt accounted for more than 25% of state and 
state-guaranteed debt. 
Policy debates on the restructuring and privatisation of the electricity supply industry of 
Thailand in order to promote competition and private sector participation are ongoing. On 5 
March 1996 the cabinet decided to separate the generation, transmission and distribution 
businesses. Under this resolution, EGA T's thermal power plants were to be separated into 
business units and then corporatised, registered and listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET) as necessary to raise funds. The cabinet's resolution of 1 September 1998 agreed to the 
Master Plan for State Enterprise Sector Reform which served as a framework for the scope and 
direction of restructuring and privatisation of the four main economic sectors, including the 
energy sector. The Master Plan envisaged that the future structure of the ESI would follow the 
competitive model being implemented in many countries around the world. This competitive 
model provided for competitive generation companies (GENCO's), which both compete into a 
power pool as well as having individual bilateral contracts with major customers. An 
independent system operator (ISO) would function as an independent referee over the 
competitive generation process. The ISO was not allowed to own generation assets in order to 
avoid any conflict of interest. The transmission company was to be owned by a separate 
company from the ISO (National Energy Policy Office, 1999. The distribution companies 
(DISCO's) were to have geographically demarcated responsibility. Under this model, 
distribution acts as a natural monopoly in the particular area, and the regulation of access and 
tariff levels was to be set by the national regulator. (\\<ww.nepo.org & (No author 
http://\\<ww . world energy . org/wec-geis/pub lications/reportsl emd/ status/thailand! default.asp ) 
The model envisaged several stages in the power sector reform process. During stage one, 
EGA T was to act as the primary power purchaser/provider. EGA T would be corporatised as a 
whole, with autonomous business units operating as profit centres, with one power plant 
Ratchaburi - being privatised. The first stage represented limited private sector participation in 
generation, providing a portion of the capital needs of EGA T. This stage provides limited 
incentives to improve productivity efficiencies, due to a lack of competition between 
generators. An independent regulatory regime for electricity was to be approved during this 
stage. Stage two implied that EGA T would remain the central supplier of power, with gradual 











operator as a subsidiary. The key elements of this stage were that EGAT would allow 
competition in bulk purchase and power supply, and there would also be enhanced private 
sector participation in both generation and retail supply by permitting generators to sell directly 
to large customers. Generators would be required to compete for sales to large customers, thus 
enhancing the efficiency of this sector. The regulator would be responsible for transmission 
and distribution pricing, as well as the implementation of incentive regulation. Stage 3 was 
originally to designed to run from 2003 onward and was characterised by a competitive 
wholesale power pool and the introduction of retail competition. Retail competition would be 
introduced for certain customers and gradually expanded to cover a wider group of consumers. 
Generators would bid into the wholesale pool and power would be dispatched according to the 
lowest bid for a certain period (National Energy Policy Office, w\\'w.nepo.org). While initial 
steps have been taken to introduce private participation in the sector, few of the above reforms 
have actually been implemented. 
EGAT's first privatisation step was the formation of a private subsidiary, EGCO. It sold two of 
the country's largest thermal stations to EGCO. Private investment in the generation sector was 
also promoted in 1994 by the granting of licences to private companies to become IPP's and 
SPP's. The results of EGA T's partial privatisation were firstly, that electricity supply options 
expanded. The overwhelming response to the private power programmes suggests that further 
state investment in electricity supply expansion is unnecessary. Secondly, it resulted in cleaner 
and more efficient electricity generation, reducing harmful emissions and cutting fuel 
consumption. Thirdly, it allowed for decentralised decision making and public accountability. 
Private ownership of power plants is fostering public scrutiny and demands for greater 
accountability and transparency between producers, consumers and local residents. (No author -
www.probeinternational.org/pi/mekong/index.cfm). 
Currently, the different forms of private sector participation allow for a diversified programme. 
As mentioned above, the SPP programme is such an example. The programme was initiated to 
promote the construction of small power plants to provide electricity from co-generation 
projects and for EGA T to purchase excess power from these projects. EGA T gives priority to 
fuels which are environmentally clean, acceptable to the general public, have stable prices and 
assured supplies. A mix of fuel types is preferred to avoid undue reliance on any particular 
fuel. Another form of private sector participation is the negotiation with a number of investors 
to buy power from projects running in neighbouring economies 











In the face of politically embarrassing labour action, the Thai government in mid-2004 
postponed the further restructuring of the EGAT indefinitely. Some analysts predict that the 
reform process will continue after the next general election in 2005, although there are still 
debates around whether EGAT should remain intact, and if it is privatised, whether the 
government should retain a majority stake. 
4.2.4 ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY AND CONSUMER INTERESTS 
Currently close to 98% of the villages have access to electricity, which does not mean that as many 
households have access. Thailand consumes on average 1448 KWh per capita per year, and 
compared with China's 827 KWh per year, it gives some indication of the energy-intensiveness of 
the popUlation and economy. In the more remote, mountainous areas access to the national grid has 
yet to be achieved. 
(No authors-http://www. probeinternational.org/pi/mekong/index.cfm& 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_ Asia/EG 17 AeO I.html). 
Electrification in Thailand was accelerated after the Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA) 
developed "The National Plan for Thailand Rural Electrification" in 1972. Currently some 66 
983 villages out of a total of 67 701 villages have been electrified. The last batch of villages are 
the most difficult to reach as they are located in national parks, forest reservations, on small 
islands or high in the mountains. The PEA will continue to investigate alternative approaches to 
supplying electricity to these villages by investigating other technologies such as mini- or micro-
hydro or solar systems. The government has established a policy on New and Renewable 
Sources of Energy (NRSE). Research, development, production and utilisation under the NRSE 
are to be directed to the production of commercially viable non-conventional technologies. In 
addition, the utilisation of non-conventional energy sources and the production and utilisation of 
proven energy technology equipment such as improved fuelwood or charcoal cooking stoves are 
being considered. The promotion of the NRSE program is seen as the task of the government. 
After the devaluation of the local currency, the Baht, the prices of commercial energy rose by 
20%, and this in turn increased the interest in renewable energy and energy conservation (No 
author - www.pressea.org). 
In terms of further electrification, the Energy Conservation Promotion Act of 1992 considers 
Renewable Energies under the heading of Energy Conservation and part of the Energy 
Conservation Promotion Fund. During 1995 and 1999 this ENCON Fund allocated about 600 











covers pig manure bio-gas on large and small farms, power generation from municipal solid 
waste, and PV power for schools in non-electrified areas. In the second phase of ENCON, 
from 2000-2004, solar PV utilization was given greater emphasis (No author -
\vww.pressea.org). 
4.2.5 CONCLUSION 
Power sector reform in Thailand has been modest. In 1992 EGCO (Electricity Generating 
Company) was established as a subsidiary of EGAT, corporatised and registered on the stock 
exchange in 1994. IPPs and SPPs have been introduced into the market. But EGAT remains 
largely intact and dominates generation and transmission. MEA and PEA still have a monopoly 
position in distribution and retail in their particular franchise areas. Thus, when speaking about 
liberalising the power sector in Thailand, one can not be but very sceptical about such efforts, as 
EGAT is not willing to relinquish its market position. 
Electrification levels were high prior to the beginning of the reform process and efforts have 
continued to reach even remote villages. However, statistics refer mainly to village 
electrification and there may be an issue of how many households still require a connection. 
Unlike many other countries in the region, Thailand has managed to secure enough capacity and 
has not faced price pressures as a result of unsustainable power purchase agreements with IPPs. 
The long term effects of EGA T' s continued dominance remain to be seen. One of the dangers is 











4.3 MALA YSIA 
4.3.1 OVERVIEW 
Malaysia has a population of 23 million and a per capita income of approximately US$3400 per 
annum. Prior to the economic crisis that hit South East Asia in 1997, the economy grew at a 
rate of approximately 8% per annum, with an electricity demand increase of 12% per annum. 
Now demand is expected once again to grow between 6% and 8% over the next decade. The 
total installed generation capacity in 2003 was 15,838MW 14,221 in Peninsular Malaysia, 
819MW in Sarawak and 789MW in Sabah. Approximately 84% of the total is thermal and 
16% hydroelectric. Peak demand for electricity is expected to grow from 8 471 MW in 1998 to 
14095 MW in 2007. 
Electricity generation in Malaysia is dominated by the following three utilities: 
• Tenaga Nasional Berhard (TNB) in Peninsula Malaysia 
• Sabah Electricity Sab. Bhd. (SESB) in the state of Sabah, and 
• Sarawak Electricity Supply Corporation (SESCO) in the state of Sarawak 
IPP's are allowed to sell electricity only to these utilities and thus there is no effective competition. 
TNB, SESB and SESCO, as vertically integrated entities, are the sole suppliers of electricity to 
consumers within their jurisdictions. In Peninsular Malaysia, two subsidiaries of TNS - TNS 
Generation and TNB Hydro, provide 60% of the installed generation capacity, while five IPP's 
provide the remaining 40%. In Sarawak SESCo provides 61 % of the installed capacity, and the rest 
is provided by two IPP's. In Sabah SESB provides 62% of the installed capacity, and five IPP's 
supply the rest 
O\Jo authors - http://www.metering.com/archive/014114_Lhtm & 
http://www. tradepartners.gov. uk/energy/malaysialprofile/overview.shtml). 
The utilities are not inter-connected and operate independently of one another in their separate 
jurisdictions. TNS is a publicly listed company, and has a monopoly over the transmission, 
distribution and retail supply of electricity in Peninsular Malaysia. It was created in 1990, 
following the corporatisation of the National Electricity Board, in line with the implementation 
of government's privatisation policy. It was floated on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, with 
the Ministry of Finance holding about 70% of the shares. TNB has seen substantial 
restructuring with the formation of many subsidiary companies. Presently TNB Generation (a 











transmission and distribution sections taken over by TNB Transmission and TNB Distribution 
respectively. 
SESB, formerly known as Lembaga Letrik Sabah, was privatised on 1 September 1998, with 
the aim of ensuring the reliability and security of the electricity supply system to consumers in 
Sabah and Labuan. SESCO is a State Statutory Body incorporated under the Sarawak 
Electricity Supply Corporation Ordinance of 1962 and is responsible for the generation, 
transmission and distribution of electricity in Sarawak. Sarawak Enterprise Corporation 
(formerly known as Dunlop Estate Bhd.) became a public listed company on 1 January 1996 




In order to keep pace with the expected national demand for electricity, the Government has 
turned to the private sector to supplement the supply of required generating capacity with the 
introduction of IPP's. Since 1993 15 IPP's, including one mini-utility have been granted 
licences, of which most are in Peninsular Malaysia, and 4 in Sabah. In addition, there are also a 
number of licensed co-generators operating throughout Malaysia in specific areas. During the 
t h Malaysia Plan period (1996-2000) the country planned to commission more than 4000 MW 
of generation capacity in order to bring the total to around 15 000 MW by 2004. Economic 
problems have caused delays for some projects 
(No author-
www.apecenergy.org.aulwelcome/publications/StrengtheningMicroReform/ Annex4 Malaysia.rtf) 
In terms of the Privatisation Master Plan of 1991, a change of the Registry Act of 1949 was 
proposed where TNB was identified as a flagship candidate for privatisation. Under the 
National Economic Recovery Plan introduced in July 1998, foreign ownership in insurance 
companies was allowed to increase from 49% to 51 %, yet this lift in restriction on majority 












4.3.1.1 REGULATION OF THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
Under the Electricity Supply Act of 1990 the regulator of the ESI is the Director General of 
Electricity_ The Minister of Energy, Communications and Multimedia appoints the Director 
General. The principal responsibilities of the regulator are: 
• to issue licences and ensure the financial vitality of licensees 
• promote competition in the industry 
• promote consumer interest by ensuring continuous supply 
• electricity at reasonable prices, and the protection and safety of the public and property 
• tariff review in consultation with the Economic Planning Unit. 
The Economic Planning Unit in the Prime Minister's Department is responsible for formulating the 
privatisation policy, formulating energy policy and selecting IPP's 
(No author-
www.apecenergy.org.aulwelcome/publicationsiStrengtheningMicroReforml Annex4Malaysia.rtf) 
To some players in the market, in practice, the Director General is not entirely independent of 
direct Government control. The Regulator takes the policies and development initiatives 
provided by the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) into consideration. A new legal and regulatory 
framework is currently being prepared to pave the way for the establishment of an Independent 
Energy Commission, a power pool system and the independent grid system operator. The 
proposal is to firstly establish a single buyer market system with the independent market 
operator as the buyer. The proposed Electricity Bill and Energy Commission Bill is to provide 
for the establishment of the Energy Commission and empower it to supervise and regulate the 
energy sector. The directive of the Energy Commission is to promote competitive market 
behaviour, prevent abuse of monopoly power and to ensure that consumers benefit from 
competition and efficiency. 
System planning, including forecasting and the approval of new generation projects, was the 
responsibility of the Inter Agency Planning Group, consisting of members of: 
• The Electricity Supply Department; 
• The Environment Planning Unit; 
• The Ministry of Finance; 
• The Ministry of Telecommunications and Multimedia; and 











• The Ministry of International Trade and Industry and other related authorities 
(w\vw.apecenergy.org.au/welcome/publications/StrengtheningMicroReform/Annex4Malay 
sia.rtf). 
4.3.2 POWER SECTOR RESTRUCTURING 
The restructuring of the ESI was spearheaded by the National Steering Committee (NSC), 
chaired by the EPU and comprises members from government agencies, TNB and IPP's. 
(http://www.metering.com/archive/014114_1.htm). 
The restructuring process was designed to be implemented in phases commencing with 
Peninsular Malaysia and later Sabah and Sarawak. Phase 1 envisaged the introduction of 
generation wholesale competition on Peninsular Malaysia and the establishment of a market 
pool operator, called the Independent Grid System Operator. Phase 2 envisaged demand-side 
participation in the market by 2005. The subsequent phases would involve the restructuring of 
the industry in Sabah and Sarawak. 
However, as with many other emerging economies and developing countries, these initial bold 
ambitions for wholesale and retail competition have not been fulfilled. There has been limited 
competition/or the market but no ongoing competition in the market. 
The Electricity Supply Act of 1990 and the Gas Supply Act of 1993 were also under review 
with the emphasis on promoting competition and preventing the abuse of monopoly or market 
power in the energy sector. A new electricity act to replace the 1990 act has the objectives of, 
amongst others, ensuring the safe use of electricity and supply to customers at reasonable 
prices; ensuring the minimising of the negative impacts of electricity supply and usage on the 
environment and the prevention of the abuse of monopoly power 
(No author-
www.apecenergy.org.au/welcome/pu b I ications/Strengthen ingM icroReforml An nex4 Malays ia.rtf) 
4.3.3 ELECTRIFICATION AND ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 
In 1995,3.7% of urban households were living in dire poverty, compared to 1% in 1997 and 
l.9% in 2000. Rural households living in poverty for the same years were 15.3%, 10.9% and 
10.0%. For the same period, the overall mean income increased exponentially by 13.1 % 
annually, with all states registering a substantial increase in mean household income, and Kuala 











Substantial progress has been made in electrification, including in rural areas. 
Table 3-Electricity Supply - Rural Electrification Coverage by Region 
IRegion 1990 1995 1998 [2000 
IPeninsular Malaysia 91% !99% 98% 100% 
!Sabah 48% 65% 70% 75% 
ISarawak 50% 167% 75% 80% 
Source: wvvw. tradeport.org/ts/countnes/malaysIahsailsarOO 17 .html 
According to the figures above, it is evident that almost all rural areas in Peninsular Malaysia 
have full access to electrification, 25% of total rural households in Sabah have no electricity 
supply, and 20% of total rural households in Sarawak have no access to electricity (infosoc 
Malaysia 2000, p.11). Between 1991 and 1995 transmission and distribution networks were 
expanded in order to improve coverage and system reliability and stability. Of total 
expenditure on rural electrification by the Federal Government, some 87% was for grid 
extension projects. TNB also invested RP 100 million in rural electrification projects within the 
Peninsula area, but unprecedented grmv1h in demand resulted in supply interruptions. 
The rural electrification programs between 1996-2000 comprised grid extensions and provision 
of stand-alone generators consisting of solar installations, micro- and mini-hydros, as well as 
some larger hydro systems. A total of some RM 469 million was allocated for rural 
electrification, benefiting 137 000 households. The states of Sabah and Sarawak received 75% 
of the Federal Government allocations. 
Initially, almost 1000 domestic TNB consumers were put on a prepayment scheme in two 
districts using electronic meters and a smart card two-way token system, and it is envisioned 
that this system is to be extended in the Peninsula at 10% annually. 
The Malaysian Government's intention with regard to expenditure on the energy sector in the is 










Table 4-Planned Energy Sector Expenditure 
RM million 1991-2000 (RM million) 
Program: 16m Malaysian Plan 17m Malaysian Plan 
Expenditure • Allocation 
Hydro 1,993.50 187.0 
rrhermal 16,306.70 10,149.60 
~ural Electricity 599.20 518.50 
rrransmission and Distribution 8,227.1 0 15,178.80 
iOthers 454.30 334.40 
I 
... 
otal 17,580.80 26,268.30 
(\\'WW. tradeport.org/ts/countries/malaysiaiisaiisarOO 1 7.html). 
In Malaysia, there is a trust fund that has been established to pay for electrification of remote 
regions. All generators contribute 1 % of their turnover to this fund and it is administered by 
the Ministry of Energy. There exists a continuous investment programme in transmission and 
distribution grids. TNB began reinforcement of the National Grid in 1996 by upgrading the 
transmission lines to 500kV. In order to ensure better security and reliability of supply SESB 
constructed the 275kVIl32kV East Coast Grid transmission line connecting all the load centres 
along the East coast of Sabah. Concerning Sarawak, SESCO extended the circuit length of the 
275k V transmission line from 569 km in 1995 to 765 km in 1998. 
Since October 1998, the Department of Electricity Supply has been regulating transmission 
tariffs, and the tariffs include cross-subsidies between regions 
(No author-
www.apeeenergy.org.au/we lcome/publications/Strengthen ingM iero Reform/Annex 4 Malays ia.rtt) 
During October 2003, some IPP's pledged to help provide electricity to more than 1600 
villages in the country under the accelerated rural electrification program. The program is a 
public-private partnership, supported by the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), aimed 
at enhancing total electrification of the country. It is hoped that the approximately 3000 
remaining villages will be electrified by 2006. The government of the Netherlands also 
pledged to provide assistance to the electrification program. This assistance will be channelled 
through three grant programs, namely the Economic Cooperation Projects Program, the 
Development-related Export Transaction Program, and the Program for Cooperation with 












The Malaysian government did not go through a process of unbundling and introduction of 
competition before it sold off some of its assets. This fact did not help the monopoly situation, 
but it serves as an interesting case, which illustrates that there does not exist a one-model-fits-
all approach. The private sector was also invited to participate as IPPs and these now supply a 
significant proportion of power. The fact that some IPP's pledged during 2003 to help with 
electricity provision to approximately 3000 villages, serves as an excellent example to the 
world to what can be achieved in terms of private/public partnerships. 
What is evident is that the Malaysian government committed large sums of capital for the 
electrification of rural areas. Nearly all households now have access in Peninsula Malaysia and 
electrification rates have increased from about 50% to nearly 80% in Sabah and Sarawak. 
Progress continues, despite partial private ownership in the main utilities. 
In terms of overall efficiency regarding power sector reform, Malaysia could not be held as a 
prime example as to how such a process should be approached. However, in terms of 
governmental commitment to deliver energy to its population by various means, Malaysia 











CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSIONS 
The history and pattern of development of the power sector in different countries over the late 
19th century and much of the 20th century was remarkably similar. Private capital was 
instrumental in the early years in mobilising investment in power generation and distribution of 
electricity to mines, industry and wealthy customers, and sometimes for public purposes such as 
street lighting. During the course of the 20th century - mostly from the 1920s to the 1960s - the 
state assumed greater control of the sector and squeezed out private sector participation and any 
possibility of competition. Electricity was seen to be a strategic industry, critical for industrial 
and economic development. The dominant industry model became the state-owned, vertically-
integrated utility. 
At first this industry model was reasonably successful. Economies of scale could be realised 
and the state could provide, or guarantee, the large amounts of investment capital that were 
needed. 
However, by the 1970s and 1980s, severe problems became evident with this model. State-
owned monopolies were not particularly efficient in allocating capital or in terms of operational 
costs. The costs of poor investment decisions or poor performance were simply passed onto 
consumers. The cost of supply became unacceptably high - and because of confused 
governance and management arrangements governments often intervened in favour of 
consumers but at the expense of the financial viability of utilities. Governments refused 
regular or sufficient price increases that covered costs. Across the globe, the typical and 
common experience was poorly- performing, financially-insolvent utilities, unable to raise 
capital for new investment and continually dependent on subsidies from government to provide 
electricity at prices that were affordable by the majority. 
The situation was unsustainable. Governments increasingly became unwilling to provide 
capital and financial flows to sustain state-owned enterprises. Attention shifted naturally to 
new possibilities for private finance, investment and management in the sector. The industry 












Chile was one of the first counties in the world to pioneer this reform path. Following on this 
experience, England and Wales became the new standard model. Vertically-integrated, 
monopoly state-owned enterprises were unbundled and privati sed. Competition was introduced. 
Electricity could be traded. Consumers could exercise choice. The intention was for operational 
efficiencies to be improved and for new private investment to be attracted into the sector. 
Many developing countries sought to emulate this model in the 1990s. However, the striking 
observation from this study is that, despite all the necessities of seeking new investment capital 
and improved operational efficiencies, very few developing counties or emerging economies 
have moved fully to a private and competitive industry. Despite countless studies and 
consultant reports, and even new policy pronouncements and legislation, reform has faltered, 
stumbled and retreated. At best, parts of the industry have been privatised. Mostly the 
incumbent utility has remained dominant. Private investment has been encouraged only on the 
margin, in the form of independent power producers but often under opaque rules and 
regulations - and often at great cost to consumers. 
Chile and Argentina went further down this reform path than most countries - but in Argentina 
we now see a retreat to greater state control. 
New hybrid models have emerged. In many countries, state-owned and managed systems 
survive. But new, private investments are sought on the margin. The end result is still unclear. 
And developing countries need still to learn how to manage these new hybrid electricity 
markets. 
The main focus of this thesis has been to track recent experience in power sector reform in a 
number of key developing countries, viz. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Namibia, South Africa, 
Uganda, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. The thesis has sought to assess the impacts of 
power sector reform on access to electricity by poor people. The remarkable overall conclusion 
is that in almost all situations, the level of access as increased over the past decade even as the 
electricity industry in developing countries has undergone remarkable and complex change. 












The experience in the various countries is summarised below. 
In Brazil, power sector reform initially involved privatisation of a number of generation and 
distribution companies. This was undertaken even before the independent electricity regulator 
was established. Over time an attempt was made to establish a competitive wholesale electricity 
market - but dispatch of power plants remained subject to engineering optimisation algorithms. 
The state is once again assuming a primary role in planning new investments and new capacity 
is allocated via bilateral contracts to distribution companies. The electrification figures obtained 
are high including the large slum settlements. Efforts continue to extend electricity access to 
remote rural areas. The state continues to provide capital and subsidies for these schemes. 
Chile was the first country in the world to unbundled and privatise its electricity industry. Chile 
initially benefited from improved efficiencies and lower electricity prices. Some of its 
privati sed electricity companies, used to competition, grew successful international businesses 
through much of Latin America as many countries began to liberalise their power sectors. 
However, there has never been full competition in the way electricity markets have developed 
in England and Wales, Nordpool, PJM or Australia, to name some competitive markets. Fears 
are also now being expressed around the ability of the power market in Chile to attract new 
investment in generation capacity which is now desperately needed. Chile, however, has been 
highly successful in extending access to electricity to more and more of its population - and 
this has happened despite the privatisation of the industry. Electrification targets were made 
clear. Development funds were allocated to the regions and utilities were invited to compete 
for lowest cost subsidies for rural electrification. The consequence has been a dramatic 
increase in rural electrification rates. Chile provides an excellent example of how public-private 
partnerships can deliver public benefits efficiently. 
Power sector reform in Argentina was initially highly successfuL The industry was unbundled 
and privatised. No generator was allowed to own more than 10% of the market. Competition 
was introduced in the form a simplified, administered wholesale market with generators 
bidding in their marginal costs for the months ahead. Significant capacity charges were also 
made. The consequence was a raft of new private investment in generation capacity. Foreign 
investors also bought distribution concessions. Efficiencies improved. Illegal connections were 
regularised. The overall impact on the poor was mixed. More poor households had to pay for 
their electricity service. Some had to pay more. In other cases, social tariffs were available. 











foreign investors suddenly were faced with revenues only a third of previous levels. The 
powers of the regulator are now emasculated. It is unclear how the crisis will be resolved. In 
terms of electrification overall connection rates are high. The challenge is in remote rural 
areas. A competitive framework was established for rural concessions and access to subsidies -
but progress in rural connections has been disappointing. 
Power sector reform in Namibia has not progressed very far. The highly fragmented 
distribution system is being rationalised into a fewer number of regional electricity distributors. 
A single-buyer model is being introduced in order to attract independent power producers 
although no new investment in generation capacity has yet been made. An initial experiment 
was made in private participation in distribution through the Northern Electricity company. 
Financial and technical performance was improved. New connections were dramatically 
increased. Yet the experiment became a victim of political manoeuvring. Namibia is 
impressive in its development of an integrated rural electrification plan. The grid is being 
systematically extended into rural areas. However, the focus is on public and economic 
infrastructure. The number of new households being connected is still unacceptably low. 
The focus in South Africa is also on the rationalisation of its distribution sector to increase 
economies of scale and scope. However, progress is slow and the first RED is still to be formed. 
On the generation side, bold moves were made to establish a competitive wholesale market through 
the creation of a power exchange and a market for bilateral contracts. However, competition is now 
longer a priority for the South African government. Reliability and security of supply has become 
paramount. Eskom, the dominant state-owned, vertically integrated utility has been given the 
responsibility for investing in capacity. IPPs will be invited to participate on the margin. Eskom 
has also been corporatised and has to pay tax and dividends to the state. It now longer makes 
available internal financial resources for electrification. The South African state makes available 
funds from National Treasury to a National Electrification Fund. Progress has been impressive. 
Within seven years, South Africa increased electricity access from one third of the population to 
70%. 
Uganda has progressed further along the power sector reform path than any other African country. 
It has broken its national power utility into separate generation, transmission and distribution 
companies and has privatised generation and distribution through concessions. A Rural 
Electrification Agency and Fund has been established. Addition concessions have been awarded to 











electricity in the country. It is probably still too early to gauge the success of these reform efforts. 
However, electrification access in Uganda remains extremely low. 
The level of development in South East Asia is higher than in Africa. Overall electricity access 
rates are generally higher. Power sector reform initially took the form of introducing IPPs. 
Many of the associated power purchase agreements were expensive and had to be re-
negotiated. In Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, power sector reform policy was more 
ambitious. Incumbent utilities were to be split up and privatised, and competition was going to 
be introduced in the form of a power pool and customer choice. A degree of privatisation was 
achieved, notably in Malaysia. However, in all three countries, the incumbent utility remains 
dominant. Full power sector liberalisation remains on the back-burner. Hybrid systems 
emerge. The state sector remains important. But space is being opened for private sector 
participation often within a confused or contested policy and regulatory framework and 
environment. Thailand and Malaysia have attained extremely high levels of electricity access. 
Programs continue to extend access to remote areas often using off-grid technologies. 
Indonesian urban access is high - but significant challenges remain in relation to rural access -
especially amongst the myriad island communities. Indonesia also has a number of 
programmes focused on improving rural electrification rates. 
In conclusion, power sector reform has been necessary to deal with a range of problems that 
emerged from the old industry model of state-owned, vertically integrated utilities. However, 
the new standard model of an unbundled, privatised, fully competitive electricity industry has 
also not been achieved. In almost all developing countries a hybrid power market is evolving. 
The private sector is invited to participate - but the state retains a crucial role. 
Electrification and affordable access for poor communities remains important for all countries. 
The impact on prices for the poor is often contradictory. The move to commercialisation and 
cost-reflective pricing often means price increases for all electricity customers. However, the 
state remains concerned about affordability for the poor and life-line tariffs or subsidies are 
often made available. 
In terms of electrification and new connections this has not often been central to the 
objectives and process of power sector reform. Yet governments have recognised that 
electrification cannot be ignored and in most cases they have set up special electrification funds 











The final conclusion of this thesis is that power sector reform is generally driven by factors 
other than the need to arrange increased access to electricity by the poor. The main drivers for 
power sector reform are to attract new investment and to improve operational efficiencies. 
Successful progress in these areas is inevitably good for poor electricity consumers. Sufficient 
power can be secured and costs can be lowered. However, progress in electrification is only 
possible if special government programmes are put in place in terms of policy, targets, 
regulation, finance and implementing agencies. In this respect, programs to improved access to 
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